William & Mary Law Review
Volume 41 (1999-2000)
Issue 5

Article 4

May 2000

Alden v. Maine and the Jurisprudence of Structure
Ernest A. Young

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons

Repository Citation
Ernest A. Young, Alden v. Maine and the Jurisprudence of Structure, 41 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1601
(2000), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol41/iss5/4
Copyright c 2000 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship
Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr

ALDEN V. MAINE AND THE JURISPRUDENCE OF
STRUCTURE
ERNEST A. YOUNG*

Last term's decision in Alden v. Maine' is the latest chapter in
the Rehnquist Court's effort to revive federalism doctrine as a
meaningful limit on the power of the national government. The
Court had already held, in Seminole Tribe v. Florida,2 that the
Constitution embodies a principle of state sovereign immunity
that is not subject to abrogation by Congress.' Alden, however,
took a significant step beyond Seminole Tribe by announcing
that this constitutional immunity applies even in state court
lawsuits where the Eleventh Amendment is wholly inapplicable.4
The voting pattern was familiar: Justice Kennedy, joined by the
Chief Justice and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas in the
majority; Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg,
and Breyer in dissent.5 In both substance and line-up, Alden is
typical of the "federalist revival" that some commentators have
identified in the Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence.6
Alden ought to be a good case to stop and examine the interpretive methodology of the "federalist revival." Yet when the
* Assistant Professor, University of Texas School of Law. B.A., Dartmouth College, 1990; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1993. Many thanks to Stuart Benjamin,
Heather Gerken, Ellen Katz, Douglas Laycock, David Rabban, and Adrian Vermeule

for helpful comments and suggestions, to Kelly Trish for excellent research assistance, to Sung Choi and the other editors of the William & Mary Law Review for

their patience and hard work, and to Allegra Young for aid and comfort.
1.
2.
3.
4.

119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999).
517 U.S. 44 (1996).
See id. at 47.
See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2246.

5. See id.
6. See Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and

Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2213 (1998); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Dueling Sovereignties: U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 109 HARV. L. REV. 78, 80
(1995) (using the term "antifederalist revival" to describe the same phenomenon). For
other examples, see Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding in favor of
states with the same judicial line-up); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)
(same).
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focus shifts from result to method, several curiosities arise. Most
would agree that the current doctrinal emphasis on state's
rights is driven in some sense by "conservative" ideology.' One
would therefore expect the new federalism cases to be dominated
-methodologically speaking-by textualism and originalism, the
two interpretive methods associated most commonly with conservatism. s Alden disappoints any such expectation, however.
It is hard to see how a textualist could view Alden as anything other than a disaster. The Court's state sovereign immunity
jurisprudence has always had a somewhat strained relationship
to the text of the Eleventh Amendment. But Alden drops the
textual fig leaf entirely, acknowledging that any principle of
immunity applicable in state court can have no basis in the Eleventh Amendment.9 After all, that amendment governs only "[t]he
Judicial power of the United States"1°--not that of the state
courts. Nor does the Alden majority purport to rest its holding
on any other provision in the constitutional text. The abandonment of textualism is as clear and self-conscious as anyone could
wish.
Instead, Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court in Alden
relies almost entirely on history. As such, it appears to rest on
the originalism espoused by many textualists-most prominently
Justice Scalia-as a necessary supplement to the not-always7. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rehnquist Court & Justice: An Oxymoron?,
1 WASH. U. J.L. & POLY 37, 41 (1999); Daniel A. Farber, The Constitution's Forgotten Cover Letter: An Essay on the New Federalism and the Original Understanding,
94 MICH. L. REV. 615, 616 (1995); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Jurisprudence of the
Rehnquist Court, 22 NOVA L. REV. 741, 758-61 (1998); see also Frank B. Cross, Realism About Federalism, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1304, 1306-13 (1999) (arguing that federalism is not an inherently ideological idea, but that its actual manifestations have
been driven by ideological predispositions of the justices).
8. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Textualism and the CountermajoritarianDifficulty,
66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1373 (1998) (developing the link between textualism and the
Rehnquist Court's substantive positions on federalism and separation of powers);
Ernest Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and Constitutional Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. REV. 619, 625-27 (1994) [hereinafter Young, Rediscovering Conservatism] (discussing the common equation of originalism with judicial
conservatism). I do not wish to deny, however, that both of these interpretive methods can be used to reach results that are hard to describe as "conservative" under
anyone's definition of that term. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS

(1998).
9. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2246.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XI (emphasis added).
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determinate text. But Justice Kennedy's originalism in Alden is
of an altogether different stripe than that advocated by Justice
Scalia, Judge Robert Bork, and others. These prominent
originalists advocate reliance on the original understanding of
constitutional text; everything depends on what the particular
textual term at issue generally would have been understood to
mean at the time it became part of the Constitution. The Alden
opinion, by contrast, asks instead whether the Framers thought
states should be suable in their own courts-a strictly intentionalist question wholly divorced from the interpretation of any
particular text.
Read in context, however, the intentionalist aspects of Alden
seem secondary to a different method entirely-one that focuses
on the original understanding of overall structure rather than
particular constitutional provisions. Justice Kennedy's argument
in Alden is not so much that the Framers thought about the particular question whether the states would be immune in their
own courts and answered that question in the affirmative. Rather,
he argues that the Framers understood the constitutional structure to embody certain broad principles-big ideas," if you will
-- drawn from the history of legal and political theory. Because
Justice Kennedy is convinced that state sovereign immunity is
one of those principles, any congressional action inconsistent
with that principle must be constitutionally invalid. Alden's lack
of any textual anchor at all makes this approach more explicit
than before, but ultimately it seems the best explanation for a
number of the Court's recent federalism cases.
In this Essay, I come neither to bury Alden's interpretive
method nor to praise it. As the action in constitutional law
shifts from issues of individual rights to government structure,
it is only natural that structural modes of interpretation will
take on a more prominent role in debates over interpretive
methodology.11 To the extent that Alden represents a relatively
distinct form of the structural method, I hope to assess its
strengths vis-a-vis other forms of constitutional argument and to

11. This is not to say that structural interpretation is confined to issues of separation of powers, federalism, and the like. See infra text accompanying notes 181-84
(discussing the use of structural interpretation in the definition of individual rights).
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identify potential pitfalls that counsel caution. Specifically, I
want to make three points about Justice Kennedy's structural
jurisprudence of "big ideas."
First, the approach to structural argument taken by the Alden
majority-and, interestingly, by the dissent as well-may be a
useful addition to the Court's interpretive repertoire. By linking
the Framers' original understandings of the Constitution's structure to broader aspects of political theory, the "big ideas" approach offers recourse to sources that may offer determinate
answers when more familiar sources, such as text and specific
history, run out. But the method also has potentially serious
liabilities, arising from its tendency to press courts toward more
complete theorization of constitutional issues. Although the
federalism cases do not provide an adequate body of evidence to
support firm conclusions, it seems likely that "big ideas"
structuralism will frequently be helpful if used with appropriate
awareness of these dangers.
Second, although Alden's structural jurisprudence represents
a significant departure from textualism and the more widely accepted versions of originalism, that does not mean that broad
structural principles should be eschewed by "conservative" jurists. Rather, Justice Kennedy's approach in Alden, and in a
number of other opinions, represents a different kind of "conservatism--one that emphasizes continuity with the past and the
organic development of social institutions over the primacy of
text. 2 Appreciating the difference between this approach and
Justice Scalia's more explicitly articulated views may enhance
our understanding of the perspectives and fault lines within the
Court's current conservative majority.
Third, the jurisprudence of "big ideas"--like any other interpretive methodology-can be done well or poorly. Just as
textualists and originalists are concerned primarily with limiting
the range of discretion available to unelected judges in constitutional cases, an adherent of "big ideas" must also take pains to
handle them in ways that constrain as well as illuminate. In
particular, a judge interpreting the constitutional structure in

12. See, e.g., Anthony T. Kronnan, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029
(1990); Young, Rediscovering Conservatism, supra note 8.
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light of first principles must be careful to take those principles
as he finds them-complete with their historical qualifications
-rather than picking and choosing among different aspects of
those principles so as essentially to construct what he had always hoped to find.
Part I of this Essay briefly describes the case law leading up
to Alden as well as the Alden majority's basic analysis."3 That
history describes a gradual but escalating deviation from the
Eleventh Amendment's text. The story culminates with the
Alden majority's decision to jettison the text entirely. In Part II,
I argue that Alden's methodology fits neither of the approaches
-textualism or originalism-usually identified with a conservative Court.' 4
Part III develops Justice Kennedy's approach to structural
argument in more detail.'" For purposes of comparison, I describe
initially two alternative models of structural argument: the structural aspects of the "New Textualism" espoused by Justice Scalia
and others, and the more open-ended structuralism of Professor
Charles Black. I next trace Justice Kennedy's emphasis on broad
structural principles from Alden back through his important
concurrences in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton 6 and United
States v. Lopez. 7 I also suggest that other recent federalism opinions, including Justice O'Connor's opinion in New York v. United
States'8 and even Justice Scalia's opinion in Printz v. United
States, 9 are best described as driven by "big ideas" rather than
more conventional modes of argument.
In Part IV, I argue that Justice Kennedy's approach may be a
useful element of the Court's interpretive arsenal, but that attention must also be paid to the method's potential liabilities." I
also contend that this sort of structuralism is perfectly consistent with judicial conservatism, properly conceived. Finally, in

13. See infra notes 23.81 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 82-152 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 153-246 and accompanying text.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

514
514
505
521
See

U.S. 779 (1995).
U.S. 549 (1995).
U.S. 144 (1992).
U.S. 898 (1997).
infra notes 247-90 and accompanying text.
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Part V, I criticize the particular application of structural principles in Alden. 2 Interestingly, there is no disagreement on interpretive method between Justice Kennedy's opinion for the majority
in Alden and Justice Souter's dissent. I conclude, however, that
Justice Souter's is the more careful approach to structural principle because it is more faithful to the historical constraints that
traditionally have cabined the concept of sovereign immunity. A
comparison of Justice Souter's use of "big ideas" structuralism in
Alden with Justice Kennedy's use of the same method suggests
criteria for evaluating the use of this method in other cases.
I. How DID WE GET HERE? THE TROUBLED RELATIONSHIP OF
THE CASES AND THE TEXT
The Eleventh Amendment provides that "[t]he Judicial power
of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State."22 The troubled relationship between that text and the Court's state sovereign immunity doctrine is a long story, and I will attempt only a brief outline here.
A. What Had Gone Before
The Court's 1890 decision in Hans v. Louisiana" is probably
the best place to start. In Hans, the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment barred a suit against the State of Louisiana by
Hans, a citizen of that state, to recover on certain state bonds. 4
Because Hans was a Louisiana citizen, federal jurisdiction was
based on the federal nature of the question, which arose under
the Contract Clause of the Constitution.2"
Not being a "[clitizen[I of another State," Hans argued that he
was "not embarrassed by the obstacle of the Eleventh Amendment," and the Court agreed that "if there were no other reason
or ground for abating his suit, it might be maintainable."2 6 The

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

See infra notes 291-333 and accompanying text.
U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
134 U.S. 1 (1890).
See id. at 10.
See id.
Id.
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Court found another reason, however: a generalized principle of
sovereign immunity based on scattered comments from the Framers and the immunity doctrines of English common
law. 7 As the
8
Mississippi:
v.
Monaco
in
Court explained later
Manifestly, we cannot rest with a mere literal application of
the words of § 2 of Article HI, or assume that the letter of the
Eleventh Amendment exhausts the restrictions upon suits
against non-consenting States. Behind the words of the constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and control.
There is the essential postulate that the controversies, as
contemplated, shall be found to be of a justiciable character.
There is also the postulate that States of the Union, still possessing attributes of sovereignty, shall be immune from suits,
without their consent, save where there has been "a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention."2 9
Monaco implemented this understanding by holding that the
states' immunity extends to suits by foreign sovereigns, and not
simply by their "citizens" or "subjects.""0 Furthermore, the Court
extended the immunity beyond suits "in law or equity" to cover
suits in admiralty. 31 Consequently, the Amendment's text was
well on its way to becoming irrelevant. As the Court concluded
in Alden, "[tihese holdings reflect a settled doctrinal understanding.., that sovereign immunity derives not from the Eleventh
Amendment but from the structure of the original Constitution
32
itself."
Hans's potentially dramatic effect on the enforceability of
federal law against state actors was mitigated by a number of
doctrines, some which predated Hans itself and others which
may have developed in response to that decision. On the same
day as Hans was decided, the Court refused to extend any sort
27. See id. at 12-15.
28. 292 U.S. 313 (1934).

29. Id. at 322-23 (1934) (footnote omitted) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton)).
30. See i&L at 330; see also Blatchford v. Native village, 501 U.S. 775, 785-86, 788
(1991) (extending the immunity to suits brought by Indian tribes); Smith v. Reeves,
178 U.S. 436, 448-49 (1900) (extending immunity to suits by federal corporations).
31. See Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 500 (1921). Admiralty suits have traditionally been viewed as distinct from suits brought "in law and equity." See, e.g.,
American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 544 (1828).
32. Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2254 (1999) (citations omitted).
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of sovereign immunity to local governments.3 3 Another response
was to reaffirm the traditional exception to sovereign immunity
for suits against the sovereign's officers.' A third was to hold,
despite the jurisdictional language of the Eleventh Amendment
itself, that state sovereign immunity is subject to waiver.3 5 Finally, and most controversially, the Court held that under certain circumstances state sovereign immunity was subject to
abrogation when Congress expressed a clear intention to subject
the states to federal suit.
The Court's first abrogation case was Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,3 6
decided in 1976. Fitzpatrickheld that Congress could subject the
states to suit in federal court, notwithstanding the Eleventh
Amendment, when acting pursuant to Congress's power to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments." "When Congress acts
pursuant to § 5," the Court said, "not only is it exercising legislative authority that is plenary within the terms of the constitutional grant, it is exercising that authority under one section of
a constitutional Amendment whose other sections by their own
terms embody limitations on state authority." 8 The more controversial step came thirteen years later in Pennsylvania v. Union

33. See Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530-31 (1890).

34. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Although Ex parte Young has been
described as a "fiction," see Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 272 (1997)

(plurality opinion) (Kennedy, J.); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNsTrruTIONAL LAW § 3-25, at 177 (2d ed. 1988) (describing the distinction between suits
against states and suits against officers as "unsatisfactory and conceptually unruly"),
its origins are as old as sovereign immunity itself, see, e.g., Coeur dAlene, 521 U.S.

at 308 (Souter, J., dissenting).
35. The waiver doctrine actually predates the expansion of Eleventh Amendment
immunity in Hans. See, e.g., Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883). Initially,
this waiver doctrine covered both ordinary waiver by express consent to suit, see
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985), and constructive waivers arising from a state's decision to engage in activity regulated by federal law, see
Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 196 (1964). However, the Court overruled
Parden and rejected the constructive waiver doctrine last term in College Savings
Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, 119 S. Ct. 2219,
2228 (1999).

36. 427 U.S. 445 (1976). The abrogation question was not litigated earlier because
Congress apparently made no explicit attempt to subject the states to suit by statute
until after the Court's 1964 decision in Parden. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2261.
37. See Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456.

38. Id.
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Gas Co., 9 which recognized a similar abrogation power when
Congress acts under its general Commerce Clause authority.
Writing for four Justices, Justice Brennan found the commerce
power indistinguishable from Congress's power under Section 5:
Because the Commerce Clause withholds power from the
States at the same time as it confers it on Congress, and because the congressional power thus conferred would be incomplete without the authority to render States liable in
damages, it must be that, to the extent that the States gave
Congress the authority to regulate commerce, they also relinquished their immunity where Congress found it necessary,
in exercising this authority, to render them liable.40
Justice White provided the fifth vote for this holding in notoriously cryptic fashion, stating that "I agree with the conclusion
reached by [Justice Brennan] ...that Congress has the authority

under Article I to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity
States, although I do not agree with much of his reasonof the
"41
ing.

Justice White's eccentric performance in Union Gas left
Congress's abrogation power-under the Commerce Clause, at
least--on shaky ground. In subsequent decisions, the Court avoided reliance on Union Gas by holding that Congress had not expressed its intent to abrogate with sufficient clarity.42 In Seminole
Tribe v. Florida,4 however, Union Gas's shaky ground fell in altogether. Noting that Union Gas never enjoyed "an expressed rationale agreed upon by a majority of the Court,"44 the Union Gas dissenters-reinforced by the arrival of Justice Thomas-held that

39. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
40. Id. at 19-20 (plurality opinion) (Brennan, J.).

41. Id. at 57 (White, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
42. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96,
101 (1989) (plurality opinion) (White, J.). The Court had taken the same approach in
several cases prior to Union Gas, assuming that the abrogation power might exist
but not reaching the question because Congress had not invoked it with sufficient
clarity. See Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways and Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 47576 & n.5 (1987); County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 252
(1985).
43. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
44. I& at 63.
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Congress lacks any power to abrogate state sovereign immunity
when it acts pursuant to its Article I powers.4 5
Seminole Tribe set the stage for last term's decisions in Alden
and College Savings Bank4 6 by appearing to leave open at least
two routes around state sovereign immunity. First, Chief Justice
Rehnquist's majority opinion in Seminole Tribe expressly reaffirmed the Court's earlier holding in Fitzpatrick-also authored
by then-Justice Rehnquist-that Congress may abrogate state
sovereign immunity when it acts pursuant to its enforcement
power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.4" The two
College Savings Bank decisions would deal with the contours of
that remaining abrogation power.4 8 Second, Seminole Tribe did
little to cast doubt on the assumption that Eleventh Amendment
doctrine implicates only the federal courts; the Amendment's
text, after all, discusses only the "Judicial power of the United
States."' 9 This assumption was to crumble in Alden.5"

45. See id. at 66. Seminole Tribe actually involved an exercise of Congress's authority under the Indian Commerce Clause of Article I, rather than the Interstate
Commerce Clause. See id. at 62. But the Court found that "the plurality opinion in
Union Gas allows no principled distinction. . . to be drawn between the Indian
Commerce Clause and the Interstate Commerce Clause." Id. at 63. The Seminole
Tribe dissenters did not challenge this equation, although Justice Souter's dissent
did note that the case for congressional abrogation authority was even clearer for
Indian affairs than for commerce generally. See id. at 147-48 (Souter, J., dissenting).
46. The College Savings Bank case actually yielded two separate decisions owing
to the different routes by which different pieces of the litigation made their way to
the Court. In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College
Savings Bank, the Court held that Congress had not validly abrogated the states'
sovereign immunity in the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification
Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296(a) (1995). See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199, 2210-11 (1999). In College Savings
Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, the Court held
that Congress likewise lacked power to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity
pursuant to the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1122 (1994). See
College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct.
2219, 2233 (1999).
47. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 65-66.
48. See generally Ernest A. Young, State Sovereign Immunity and the Future of
Federalism, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 13-17 [hereinafter Young, State Sovereign Immunity] (describing the College Savings Bank holdings). The Court further limited the
scope of Congress's Section 5 power this term in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,
120 S. Ct. 631 (2000).
49. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. Some commentators after Seminole Tribe did question
this assumption. See Carlos Manuel Vazquez, What Is Eleventh Amendment Immu-
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B. Alden and the States' Immunity in Their Own Courts
The Alden litigation began when state employees in Maine
sued their employer under the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA), which was made applicable to state governments by
amendments in 1974.51 The employees, who sought compensation and liquidated damages under the FLSA, brought their suit
initially in federal court, but that suit was dismissed in the
wake of Seminole Tribe.52 The employees then turned to state
court, only to have their suit dismissed again on the basis of
sovereign immunity.5" The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine affirmed the dismissal, holding that the provision of the FLSA
purporting to subject the states to suit in their own courts was
unconstitutional.54
The United States Supreme Court affirmed. Justice Kennedy's
majority opinion began by squarely confronting the Eleventh
Amendments inconvenient text:
[Tihe fact that the Eleventh Amendment by its terms limits
only "[the Judicial power of the United States" does not
resolve the question. To rest on the words of the Amendment
alone would be to engage in the type of ahistorical literalism
we have rejected in interpreting the scope of the States' sov-

nity?, 106 YALE L.J. 1683, 1702-03 (1997) (noting language in Seminole Tribe indicat-

ing that the majority saw the amendment as recognizing a broad-based immunity
from suit, rather than constituting a mere forum-selection clause); see also Ellen D.
Katz, State Judges, State Officers, and Federal Commands After Seminole Tribe and
Printz, 1998 WIs. L. REv. 1465, 1468 (making a similar observation).

50. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2266 (1999). A third route around Seminole Tribe-suits against state officers for injunctive relief under Ex parte
Young-remains open. But see Vicki C. Jackson, Seminole Tribe, the Eleventh
Amendment, and the Potential Evisceration of Ex Parte Young, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv.
495 (1997).
51. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, §§ 6(a)(3)(d),
88 Stat. 55, 58-59 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(d), 203(e)(2)(C) (1995)).
52. See Mills v. Maine, 118 F.3d 37, 55-56 (1st Cir. 1997) (affirming the district
court's dismissal of the suit).
53. See Alden v. State, 715 A.2d 172 (Me. 1998), affd, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999); see
also Katz, supra note 49, at 1530 n.318 (collecting similar cases barring FLSA suits
against the states in federal court).
54. See Alden, 715 A.2d at 173-74.
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ereign immunity
since the discredited decision in Chisholm
55
[v. Georgia].

Sovereign immunity, the majority made clear, "derives not from
the Eleventh Amendment
but from the structure of the original
56
itself."
Constitution
Having concluded that the Eleventh Amendment itself could
not resolve the question of a state's immunity in its own courts,
the majority considered and rejected arguments that other constitutional provisions foreclosed such immunity.5" Because the
Supremacy Clause covers "only those federal Acts that accord
with the constitutional design," Justice Kennedy said, that
clause "merely raises the question whether a law is a valid exercise of the national power."5 8 Nor could the Necessary and Proper
Clause support subjecting states to suit as an incidental means
of implementing Congress's Article I powers. Quoting the Court's
prior holding in Printz, the Court reasoned that a law that violates principles of state sovereignty is not "proper" within the
meaning of that clause.59
55. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2254.
56. Id. For similar statements in the prior case law, see, for example, Idaho v.
Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 267-68 (1997) (acknowledging "the broader concept of immunity, implicit in the Constitution, which we have regarded the Eleventh
Amendment as evidencing and exemplifying"); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S.
44, 69 (1996) ("[W~e long have recognized that blind reliance upon the text of the
Eleventh Amendment is 'to strain the Constitution and the law to a construction
never imagined or dreamed of." (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890)));
Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921) ("That a State may not be sued without its consent is a fundamental rule of jurisprudence . . . [.1 [Ihe entire judicial
power granted by the Constitution does not embrace authority to entertain a suit
brought by private parties against a State without consent given: not one brought by
citizens of another State . . .because of the Eleventh Amendment; and not even one
brought by its own citizens, because of the fundamental rule of which the Amendment is but an exemplification." (citations omitted)).
57. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2263-66. The Court also rejected arguments that the
case was controlled by prior decisions sustaining suits against state governments in
state courts. See Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197 (1991);
Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
58. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2255.
59. Id. at 2256 (quoting Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923-24 (1997)). The
quoted passage from Printz relied on academic commentary reading "proper" as imposing a limit on Congress's Article I powers. See Gary Lawson & Patricia B.
Granger, The 'Proper" Scope of Federal Power: A JurisdictionalInterpretation of the
Sweeping Clause, 43 DKE L.J. 267 (1993).
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Justice Kennedy's affirmative case for a nonabrogable state
sovereign immunity in state courts began with the Constitution's
preratification history, as well as with early congressional practice and the Court's early immunity decisions. The ratification
debates focused on whether Article Ill, by providing for federal
jurisdiction over suits between states and individuals from out of
state, would provide an end-run around state sovereign immunity.60 Based on this focus, the Court inferred that immunity in
the states' own courts must have been taken as given.6 1
The Court relied heavily upon statements in The Federalistto
confirm sovereign immunity as one of the Constitution's background presuppositions.6 2 This presupposition was corroborated,
the Court found, by the absence of any early federal legislation
purporting to authorize suits against nonconsenting states in
their own courts, as well as frequent judicial recognition of the
states' general immunity in those courts.6 3
The majority relied as well upon the political reaction to
Chisholm v. Georgia" that culminated in the Eleventh Amendment. In Chisholm, the Court held that Article III had, in fact,
abrogated any preexisting immunity the States might have had,
and accordingly exercised jurisdiction over a private lawsuit
against the State of Georgia to collect a debt.6" The "profound
shock" engendered by that decision, as well as the swift adoption
of the constitutional amendment reversing the court's holding,
indicated to the Court majority that Chisholm itself must have

60. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2252.
61. See id.
62. See id. at 2256-57. In particular, the Court quoted at length from The Federalist No. 81, in which Alexander Hamilton wrote that "[i]t is inherent in the nature of
sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent...
Unless, therefore, there is a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention, it will remain with the States. .. ." THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 487-88 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). But see Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44, 144 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (offering a different reading of The Federalist No. 81). Although the dissent was able to point to contrary statements in the
historical record, the majority rejected this evidence as atypical of the original understanding. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2252-53. For the dissent's evidence, see id. at
2276-79 (Souter, J., dissenting).
63. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2252-53.
64. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
65. See id, at 428-29.
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violated a widely held belief that the states were not subject to
suit.66 The majority thus explained the Amendment's limited
text as directed to the precise holding of Chisholm (permitting a
diversity suit against a state) without signifying the limits of the
founding generation's understanding of the states' immunity. 7
"The Eleventh Amendment confirmed rather than established
sovereign immunity as a constitutional principle," Justice Kennedy said.68 "[Ilt follows that the scope of the States' immunity
from suit is demarcated not by the text of the Amendment alone
but by fundamental postulates implicit in the constitutional de"
sign. 69

Perhaps the most important support for state immunity, however, came from "the essential principles of federalism and...
the special role of the state courts in the constitutional design."7°
Justice Kennedy began with "the indignity of subjecting a State
to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the instance of
private parties." 7' Though this indignity is bad enough when the
suit is in a federal court, it is even worse in the state's own
courts: "[To press a State's own courts into federal service,"
Justice Kennedy argued, is "to turn the State against itself and
ultimately to commandeer the entire political machinery of the
State against its will and at the behest of individuals." 7' As a
practical matter, such "commandeering" would permit courts
and private litigants to disrupt the basic resource allocation
decisions of state governments." Finally, the Court rejected the
66. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2250-51 (quoting 1 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT

IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 96 (rev. ed. 1926)). The dissent, on the other hand, argued that the four justices in the Chisholm majority-several of whom had been
prominent Framers themselves-could hardly have decided as they did if the founding generation had generally understood the states to possess a nonabrogable form
of sovereign immunity. See id. at 2279 (Souter, J., dissenting).
67. See id. at 2252.
68. Id. at 2254.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 2263.
71. Id. at 2264 (quoting Ex parte Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887)).
72. Id.
73. See id. In so doing, the Court said, abrogation of state immunity would blur
lines of political accountability for those allocation decisions. See id. at 2265. This
concern is similar to the political accountability arguments in New York u. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1992), and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 930
(1997).
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suggestion that Congress might have broader control over state
sovereign immunity in the state's own courts than Congress has
in the federal courts.74 Echoing its anticommandeering precedents, the Court rejected any suggestion that "Congress may in
some cases act only through instrumentalities of the States."75
Finally, the Court carefully distinguished between its immunity
doctrine and a rule exempting states from the coverage of federal
statutes. Recognition of state sovereign immunity, the Court insisted, would not "confer upon the State a concomitant right to
disregard the Constitution or valid federal law." 6 Congress retains
the power to abrogate state immunity when it acts pursuant to the
Section 5 power, as well as means-such as conditional grants of
federal funding77-- to induce state consent to suit in other cases.7"
States remain subject to suits by the federal government or by
other states, and both their individual officers and their political
subdivisions may be sued by individuals. 79 In light of these principles, the Court concluded that "a federal power to subject nonconsenting States to private suits in their own courts is unnecessary to
uphold the Constitution and valid federal statutes as the supreme
law."80
Notwithstanding these efforts to downplay the significance of
the Court's holding, Alden is an important extension of the
immunity doctrines announced in Seminole Tribe. Although
Seminole Tribe (and arguably Hans before it) recognized a con-

74. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2265.
75. Id. The Court rejected an argument, based on Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386
(1947), that state courts cannot refuse to hear federal claims on the basis of sovereign immunity. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2265-66; see also Katz, supra note 49, at
1528-38 (developing this argument). Where a case does not fall within the federal
judicial power because of state sovereign immunity as expressed in the Eleventh
Amendment, the Court said, Testa's obligation to hear federal claims does not apply.
See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2265-66.
76. Id. at 2266.
77. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). See generally Lynn A.
Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911 (1995)
(arguing that "the Lopez majority should reinterpret the Spending Clause" to prevent
end-runs around the limits on federal power that the Court has recognized).
78. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2267.
79. See id.
80. Id. at 2268. I have argued elsewhere that these alternatives may actually
leave the states worse off than if they were simply subject to suit by individuals.
See Young, State Sovereign Immunity, supra note 48, at 58-65.
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stitutional immunity extending beyond the Eleventh
Amendment's text, that immunity had been focused, like the
amendment itself, on the federal judicial power. Alden, however,
extended this immunity to an area-proceedings in state
court-with which neither the amendment nor the historical
debates that preceded it had been concerned."' In the comments
that follow, I argue that the interpretive dynamics of this leap
can tell us some important things about the current Court.
II. ALDEN'S ABANDONMENT OF TEXTUALISM AND ORIGINALISM
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Alden is startling in its
candor: "Mhe scope of the States' immunity from suit is demarcated not by the text of the [Eleventh] Amendment alone but by
fundamental postulates implicit in the constitutional design." 2
One might omit the word "alone" from this statement, for it
comes in the course of acknowledging that nothing in the
Amendment itself really bears on the case. Nor does the Court's
opinion seriously suggest any other textual ground for the decision. 3 In other words, the Court saw no need to ground its decision in any constitutional text.
Alden's abandonment of textualism is striking, particularly in
light of the well-known commitment to textualist methodology
shared by several members of the majority, especially Justice
Scalia." "What I look for in the Constitution," Justice Scalia has
said, "is precisely what I look for in a statute: the original mean81. See Young, State Sovereign Immunity, supra note 48, at 20 (suggesting that
the Court could have distinguished Seminole Tribe if it had chosen to rule the other
way in Alden).
82. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2254.
83. There is a passing reference to the Tenth Amendment, see id. at 2247, 2259,
but the majority does not seriously dispute-at least in this case--the settled interpretation that the Tenth Amendment has little independent significance beyond affirming the theory of limited federal powers. See id. at 2259.
84. See, e.g., ANTONIN ScALIA, A MATrIER OF INTERPRETATION 23 (1997) (avowing
allegiance to textualism in statutory interpretation); Frank H. Easterbrook,
Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1119, 1121 (1998) (describing Justice Thomas as "the Supreme Court's most thoroughgoing textualist"); see also
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Should the Supreme Court Read The Federalist but Not
Statutory Legislative History?, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1301, 1301 n.3 (1998) (noting
general agreement but subtle differences between the textualism of Justices Thomas
and Scalia).
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ing of the text." 5 The departure is worth exploring for at least
three reasons. First, many scholars have considered the "increasing acceptance" of textualism at the Supreme Court as "one
of the most important developments in recent years."8 6 It is
therefore appropriate to ask whether Alden represents a waning
of the Court's commitment to textualism in constitutional interpretation. Second, and more important, we may learn something
about the nature of textualism itself as we try to define what is
textualist in Alden and what is not. Finally, careful attention to
the Alden Court's departures from textualism can put us well on
the way to identifying and understanding the methodology that
the Court did employ.
A. A Tough Day for Textualists, or, Did Justice Scalia Really
Sign This Thing?
There may be no clear and concise definition of textualism. One
might say that textualism "accords to constitutional language
overriding importance in questions of interpretation,"8 7 or that
"the primary characteristic of textualism is its attention to the
fact of textuality itself." 8 But the very conciseness of these definitions keeps them from taking us very far.89 Instead, textualism
seems to have defined itself primarily in opposition to other tendencies in statutory and constitutional interpretation. Two of
these tendencies stand out: the "common law" tendency to emphasize prior interpretations of enactments, as embodied in judicial
85. SCALIA, supra note 84, at 38.
86. Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Textualism and Federalism: The Proper
Textual Basis of the Supreme Court's Tenth and Eleventh Amendment Decisions, 93
NW. U. L. REV. 819, 820 (1999); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New
Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 621 (1990) (recognizing that "new textualism"

challenges the traditional approach of "considering any contextual evidence"); Mark
V. Tushnet, A Note on the Revival of Textualism in ConstitutionalTheory, 58 S. CAL.
L. REV. 683, 684 (1985) (recognizing the "revival of textualism," but arguing that
"textualism suffers from the same flaws exposed by the attacks on originalism and

interpretivism").
87. Rappaport, supra note 86, at 822.
88. George H. Taylor, Structural Textualism, 75 B.U. L. REV.
89. See, e.g., id. at 330 (suggesting that '[t]he recognition
Derrida and Foucault are textualists demonstrates not only the
gory, but also its refusal to be defined or circumscribed by any
losophy or ideology").

321, 324 (1995).
that critics such as
breadth of the cateone interpretive phi-
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precedents, over the text of the enactments themselves, 0 and the
intentionalist search for the subjective purpose of an enactment's
drafters rather than the objective intent reflected in the
enactment's text.91
Justice Scalia decried the first tendency-the common law
method of decision in statutory and constitutional cases-in his
recent and influential Tanner Lectures at Princeton University.92

An approach that starts with "the logic that those [Supreme
Court] cases expressed, with no regard for how far that logic,
thus extended, has distanced us from the original text and
understanding," Justice Scalia said, "is preeminently a commonlaw way of making law, and not the way of construing a democratically adopted text."" The evolutionary nature of common
lawmaking, Justice Scalia argued, is contrary to the "whole purpose" of having a constitution, which "is to prevent change-to
embed certain rights in such a manner that future generations
cannot readily take them away."94 More importantly, common
lawmaking is judiciallawmaking, which is in fundamental tension with the democratic ideal.9 5
Given the textualist aversion to common law decision making,
one might have seen Alden's candid abandonment of the Elev90. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTrrUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 33

(1982) ("One corollary of the textual approach is a disregard of precedent."); see also
Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POLY 23 (1994) (arguing that adherence to stare decisis is unconstitutional when
precedents are inconsistent with the original understanding of the constitutional
text). For examples of the common law tendency, see David A. Strauss, Common
Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 884-91 (1996); Young,
Rediscovering Conservatism, supra note 8, at 688-97.
91. See Taylor, supra note 88, at 327 ("One of the defining insights of textualism
is that it directs attention to the text rather than the text's author."); Eskridge,
supra note 86, at 666 (suggesting that the new textualism's "main contribution has
been to debunk the formalist claims of intentionalist interpretation").
92. See SCALIA, supra note 84, at 3.
93. Id. at 39-40; see also Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN.
L. REV. 849, 862 (1989) (making a similar argument).
94. SCALIA, supra note 84, at 40.
95. See id. at 10 (describing "the uncomfortable relationship of common-law lawmaking to democracy"). I do not mean to imply that I share Justice Scalia's aversion
to common law constitutionalism; in fact, I have argued for just such an approach
elsewhere as the most persuasive, and most "conservative," approach to constitutional
interpretation. See Young, Rediscovering Conservatism, supra note 8, at 688-97. I
seek here only to highlight methodological tensions within the Alden majority.
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enth Amendment's text foreshadowed by a remarkable exchange
in Seminole Tribe. In response to the dissent's argument that
the best reading of the Amendment's text would not apply to federal question cases, Chief Justice Rehnquist replied that the text
was a "straw man" in this context. 96 An obviously amused Justice Souter responded that, far from being a "straw man," "plain
text is the Man of Steel" compared to the amorphous "postulates
which limit and control" relied upon by the majority.97
Seminole Tribe was a common law decision, and not simply
because the ultimate source of the majority's background principle of sovereign immunity was the English common law. The
best argument for the majority's result was that, although it
could not be drawn from the Eleventh Amendment's plain text,
it was dictated by a long series of prior judicial decisions inter98
preting that text. Although the point was not free of dispute,
the majority insisted that its result was compelled by Hans and
that it was simply too late in the day to overturn that centuryold precedent.9 9 This is classic common law constitutionalism, as
it accords primacy to judicial precedents over the unmediated
text.' That Justices Scalia and Thomas joined the Seminole
Tribe majority only makes the decision more puzzling.
Alden, unlike Seminole Tribe, is not really a case of common
lawmaking resting on arguments from precedent. Rather, as
Justice Kennedy's opinion cheerfully admitted, the issue whether
Congress could subject the States to suit in their own courts was
"a question of first impression."' As I have already discussed,
96. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 69 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 116 n.13 (Souter, J., dissenting). The Court conceded that if the text
alone were at issue, the dissents position that the Amendment barred only suits
where federal jurisdiction rested on state-citizen diversity would be correct. See id.
at 69-70; see also Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 40 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (making a similar concession).
98. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 116-17 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that
neither Hans nor any of its progeny had decided the abrogation question, because
none of those cases involved any affirmative effort by Congress to override state sovereign immunity).
99. See id. at 68-71; see also Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 34-35 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(coming to a similar conclusion).
100. See generally Strauss, supra note 90, at 904-05 (discussing the primacy of doctrine in common law constitutional interpretation); Young, Rediscovering Conservatism, supra note 8, at 693 (same).
101. Alden v. Maine, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 2260 (1999).
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the Alden majority is even more candid than the Seminole Tribe
Court in disavowing any reliance on the text of the Eleventh
Amendment or any other constitutional provision. Instead, the
argument is almost wholly a direct appeal to history: Would the
founding generation, the Court asks, have believed that Congress had2 the power to subject the States to suit in their own
10
courts?

The turn to originalist history, of course, is hardly surprising
in a federalism case. Indeed, the more surprising aspect of the
recent federalism cases generally is the virtual unanimity with
which the Justices have accepted the primacy of historical argument. 10 3 Nor is heavy reliance on history necessarily inconsistent
with textualism. For many textualists, allegiance to the constitutional text rests on a theory of constitutional positivism: "All
power stems from the sovereign people, and the authority of the
Constitution comes from their act of sovereign will in creating
it."' 0 ' On this understanding, the Constitution should be interpreted in accord with what the people understood themselves to
be consenting to-that is, according to the commonly understood
meaning of the text at the time of ratification. 5 Historical evi06
dence obviously plays a large role in recovering that meaning.

102. See, e.g., id. at 2248 (observing that "[the leading advocates of the Constitution assured the people in no uncertain terms that the Constitution would not strip
the States of sovereign immunity"); id. at 2253 (asserting that "'[t]he Constitution
never would have been ratified if the States and their courts were to be stripped of
their sovereign authority except as expressly provided by the Constitution itself."
(quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 239 n.2 (1985))).
103. See Adrian Vermeule & Ernest A. Young, Hercules, Herbert, and Amar: The
Trouble with Intratextualism, 113 HARV. L. REV. 730, 757-58 (2000) (noting that the
Justices frequently agree on interpretive method in particular substantive areas,
despite the absence of consensus on a general interpretive approach applicable to the
Constitution as a whole); see also Atascadero State Hosp., 473 U.S. at 247-48
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (adopting an originalist approach in the Eleventh Amendment context).
104. Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 1127, 1132 (1998); see also Frederick Schauer, Constitutional Positivism, 25 CoNN. L. REV. 797, 807 (1993) (stating that "positivism is likely to be most
appealing to those least inclined to sympathy with the existing constitution order").
105. See McConnell, supra note 104, at 1132.
106. See Taylor, supra note 88, at 332 (emphasizing that prominent textualists "all
allow for historical inquiry into the contemporaneous meaning of textual terms. It is
therefore inadequate . . . to define [textualism], writ large, as necessarily implying a
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The Alden majority's use of history, however, seems to fall
squarely within the second interpretive tendency to which textualism stands opposed: the "intentionalist" quest for the subjective purpose of a document's framers rather than the objective
meaning reflected in the text itself.1" 7 Textualism's rejection of
subjective intention has been most frequently discussed in the
context of statutory construction. Justice Scalia, for example,
has declared that "'legislative intent' divorced from text" is a subterfuge: "[Imt is simply incompatible with democratic government.., to have the meaning of a law determined by what the lawgiver meant, rather than by what the lawgiver promulgated."" 8
Intentionalism remains equally anathema when textualists
shift to constitutionalinterpretation. For example, Judge Robert
Bork has carefully distinguished his commitment to the "original
understanding" of words and phrases in the constitutional text
from the specific intent approach: 0 9
It is important to be clear about this. The search is not for a
subjective intention.... When lawmakers use words, the law
that results is what those words ordinarily mean.... All that
counts is how the words used in the Constitution would have
been understood at the time. The original understanding is
thus manifested in the words used and in secondary materials, such as debates at the conventions, public discussion,

separation from historical context").

107. See generally id. at 330-33 (describing "Original Meaning versus Original Intent").
108. SCALIA, supra note 84, at 17, 22; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of
Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 59, 60 (1988)

("The words of the statute, and not the intent of the drafters, are the 'law.'"). But
see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of ConstitutionalInter-

pretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1197-98 (1987) (pointing out that textualists may
also choose to rely exclusively on contemporary meaning). Alexander Hamilton advocated a similar approach in an early memorandum to President Washington:
"[W]hatever may have been the intention of the framers of a constitution, or of a
law, that intention is to be sought for in the instrument itself, according to the
usual & established rules of construction." ALEXANDER HAMILTON, OPINION ON THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AN ACT TO ESTABLISH A BANK (1791), reprinted in 8 THE
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 111 (Harold C. Syrett et al. eds., 1965).
109. ROBERT H. BoRK, THE TEMPIING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
THE LAW 162 (1990) (rejecting the "requirement that the judge know what the specific intention of the lawgiver was regarding the case at hand").
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newspaper
articles, dictionaries in use at the time, and the
110
like.
What the textualist must not do, however, is "appeal to the
author as an independent authority outside the text who resolves and settles interpretive issues."1 1'
By now the Alden Court's departure from textualism-and
any form of originalism consistent with textualism" 2 -should be
clear. Unlike cases like U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,13 in
which the principal opinions focused on the original meaning of
the Qualifications Clauses of Article I, or Justice Thomas's concurrence in United States v. Lopez," 4 which sought the original
meaning of the Commerce Clause, the Alden majority was not
concerned with the original understanding of terms found in the
constitutional text. There is no effort, for instance, to use historical evidence to determine what the words of the Eleventh
Amendment would have been understood to mean at the time
that the Amendment was adopted.
Instead, Justice Kennedy's historical discussion in Alden is
directed toward establishing "the founding generation's intent to
preserve the States' immunity from suit in their own courts."" 5
The point, again, is not to ask what the Constitution's actual

110. Id. at 144; see also Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1175, 1185 (1989) (emphasizing that judges are bound by the "original
meaning of constitutional text," not the intent of the drafters); Henry Paul
Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723,
725-27 (1988) ('The relevant inquiry must focus on the public understanding of the
language when the Constitution was developed.").
111. Taylor, supra note 88, at 334. But see Eskridge, supra note 84, at 1314 (suggesting that in the context of constitutional interpretation, original "intent" and original "understanding" turn out to be "essentially the same"). While Professor Eskridge
may be correct that the intent/meaning distinction blurs in many cases, the distinction remains sharp in cases like Alden where the intentionalist disavows any reliance on any particular text.
112. Some originalists, of course, are not textualists. See, e.g., Edwin Meese HI, Toward a Jurisprudence of OriginalIntention, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoLY 5, 5 (1988)
(advocating reliance on the Framers' subjective intentions as well as the constitutional
text). But most prominent originalists-such as Judge Bork and Justice Scalia-claim
allegiance to both textualism and originalism. See BOR, supra note 109, at 9, 143;
SCALIA, supra note 84, at 24.
113. 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
114. 514 U.S. 549, 584-93 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
115. Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2260 (1999).

20001

THE JURISPRUDENCE OF STRUCTURE

1623

words mean, but rather what the Framers anticipated the
Constitution's consequences to be with regard to the states' preexisting immunities. This is intentionalism pure and simple. For
the textualist, as Richard Epstein has written, "Itihe dominant
loyalty is to the text as written16 and not to the framers' views of
the consequences it entailed.""
Most originalists have long denied, for instance, that they are
bound to reject the result in Brown v. Board of Education because the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment probably did
not expect that the Equal Protection Clause would require desegregated public schools." What matters is that the original
meaning of "equal protection"-as understood in 1868-was
broad enough to encompass the equality principle implemented so
forcefully in Brown. "The text itself," Judge Bork has concluded,
"demonstrates that the equality under law was the primary
goal.""' Although the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
may also have harbored an expectation that segregation would
not be affected, that expectation is immaterial: "[Elquality, not
separation, was written into the text."" 9
The critical point is that, for the textualist originalist, historical evidence has no meaning apart from an inquiry into the
meaning of a particular textual provision. Justice Souter thus
protested in his Alden dissent that:
The Framers' intentions and expectations count so far as they
point to the meaning of the Constitution's text or the fair
implications of its structure, but they do not hover over the
to a world
instrument to veto any application of its principles
120
that the Framers could not have anticipated.
116. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 28 (1985); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Abstraction and Authority,
59 U. Cm. L. REv. 349, 359 (1992) (arguing that the inquiry is "not what the drafters thought their rule would accomplish (a dead end version of private meaning we
could call 'expectationism'), but what their rule is").

117. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 109, at 76-77 (finding Brown to be "a great and
correct decision" despite the fact that "those who ratified the [Fourteenth]
amendment did not think it outlawed segregated education or segregation in any
aspect of life").
118. Id. at 82.
119. Id.
120. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2291 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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Even prior to Alden, however, the Court's Eleventh Amendment
precedents had abandoned any such textual inquiry.'21 As Ellen
Katz has observed, "[the Court's repeated departures from the
[Eleventh] Amendment's language when construing its scope
suggest that the justices, including the Court's most ardent
textualists, may deem the Amendment's text unpersuasive evidence of the framers' intent." 122 After Alden, of course, there is
no more room for speculation: Justice Kennedy's disavowal of
any textual inquiry is as candid as it is unequivocal. The question remains, then, exactly what is the Court interpreting?
B. Is a Textualist Alternative Possible?
Before addressing that question directly, I want to consider a
potential objection, that is, that the Alden opinion cannot tell us
anything important about the limits of textualism because the
Court simply missed a viable textualist resolution of the case.
Michael Rappaport has suggested that there is, in fact, a viable
textualist approach to the state sovereign immunity cases based
on the meaning of the word "state" in the Constitution.' 3 Other
commentators-Deborah Jones Merritt, as well as Gary Lawson
and Patricia Granger-have argued that federalism doctrine
generally can be rested on the Guarantee Clause or the Necessary and Proper Clause, respectively."2' My conclusion is that in
each of these cases, the particular textual term serves as a
shorthand for structural considerations rather than a font of
meaningful textual analysis.
Professor Rappaport feels strongly that the Court's state sovereignty jurisprudence must have some textual basis in the
Constitution, and he finds one in the meaning of the word
"state" as used in the original document. "In 1789," he argues,
"the principal meaning of the term in this context was an inde-

121. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 69 (1996) (disparaging the
dissent's argument from text).
122. Katz, supra note 49, at 1478.
123. See Rappaport, supra note 86, at 821, 830-68.
124. See Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1988); Lawson & Granger, supra
note 59.
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5
pendent nation or country that had complete sovereignty."1
This conclusion derives from traditional "original meaning" sorts
of sources, such as usage in other important documents and
leading legal commentaries of the era." Rappaport then develops the state immunities recognized in the Court's current federalismjurisprudence-especially the anticommandeering principle
and state sovereign immunity from suit-from his view of what
such sovereignty in the context
would be necessary to preserve
127
system.
federal
of our present
The primary question for Rappaport is whether the term
"state" itself is really doing any of the interpretive work in his
analysis. One clue to the answer is Rappaport's failure to consider
in any systematic way the particular constitutional provisions in
which the word "state" appears. Instead, it seems sufficient for
him simply to note that the Constitution frequently refers to
"states," so it necessarily presumes the existence of entities that
fit that description. 2 That is fine so far as it goes-indeed, this

125. Rappaport, supra note 86, at 830.
126. See id. at 832-33. Rappaport also relies on intratextual comparisons to particular places in the Constitution where "state" appears in a context that clearly contemplates a governmental entity with complete sovereignty. See id. at 833; see also
infra text accompanying notes 158-59 (discussing "intratextualism").
127. See Rappaport, supra note 86, at 838-49. For state sovereign immunity in
federal court, Rappaport also relies upon the meaning of the "judicial [plower" in the
Vesting Clause of Article III. See id.at 869-74. This seems unpersuasive. For instance, if federal "judicial [plower" cannot include suits against the states under
Article HI, then the Eleventh Amendment would be superfluous. But see Alden v.
Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2251 (1999) (arguing that the Eleventh Amendment was
made necessary only by the wrong turn supposedly taken by the Court in Chisholm).
Moreover, Rappaport would have a hard time explaining the several instances in
which the federal courts do exercise their Article III "judicial [plower" over unconsenting states-such as suits brought by the United States, see, e.g., United States
v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 644-45 (1892), or appellate jurisdiction over private lawsuits
against a state government brought initially in state court, see, e.g., McKesson Corp.
v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 27 (1990). In any event,
Rappaport makes clear that when a suit is in state court, as in Alden, any constitutional immunity must derive from the term "state" itself. See Rappaport, supra note
86, at 873-74.
128. Indeed, many of the constitutional provisions where the word "state" appears
have little direct bearing on most federalism controversies. Perhaps the largest class
of these provisions involve procedures for federal elections. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 2 (elections for House of Representatives); id. art. II, § 1 (electoral college). The
Commerce Clause and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments all mention "State[sl,"
but these clauses are not set up in such a way that the term does much work. In
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approach is basically similar to Justice Kennedy's approach in
Alden. 129 But there is nothing particularly "textualist" about it.
Rappaport is not construing particular provisions-he is arguing
about the structure
of the government that those provisions
13 0
presuppose.
Moreover, Rappaport seems to give away the game entirely
when he concedes that we cannot simply adopt the eighteenthcentury definition of "state" as a fully sovereign power. 3 ' Instead, he says that upon entering the Union "the states had as
much sovereignty as was consistent with structure, purpose, and
history." 32 The critical questions in Rappaport's analysis, then,
are whether particular immunity doctrines are (a) necessary to
preserve the states' role in the federal system, and (b) not inconsistent with the limitations on state sovereignty necessarily
imposed by that system. These are structural questions, not textual ones.

the Tenth Amendment, for example, the powers reserved to the "States" are defined
simply as those not delegated to the federal government. Of the clauses that do
actually purport to define the contours of state authority, most are limitations rather
than protections. See, e.g., id. art. 1, § 10 (no state entry into treaties or alliances,
no bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, or impairments of contracts, etc.); id.
amend. XIV (no state abridgement of privileges or immunities, deprivations of due
process, or denials of equal protection). The best exception to this pattern may be
the Guarantee Clause, id. art. IV, § 4, which might be read to say that the authority of the "State"-defined as the elements of sovereignty entailed by "a Republican
Form of Government"-is something that the federal government must respect. But
to rely on this use of "State" is simply to collapse Professor Rappaport's argument
into Professor Merritt's argument based explicitly on the Guarantee Clause. I discuss
that argument infra, at text accompanying notes 133-43.
129. See infra notes 220-27 and accompanying text. In Alden, Justice Kennedy noted
that "[vlarious textual provisions of the Constitution assume the States' continued
existence and active participation in the fundamental processes of governance."
Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2247; see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 919
(1997). But Justice Kennedy did not further rely on or interpret those particular
provisions.
130. Cf Fallon, supra note 108, at 1201 (characterizing as "arguments of constitutional theory" arguments that focus on the structural presuppositions of the text
without relying on "the precise linguistic meaning of particular constitutional provisions").
131. See Rappaport, supra note 86, at 836 ("It is true that this interpretation does
depart from the ordinary meaning in that it confers only some attributes of sovereignty on the states, but such modifications of ordinary meanings are common and
entirely appropriate.").
132. Id. at 837.
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Other attempts to ground limits on national power in particular textual provisions suffer from a similar problem. Deborah
Jones Merritt, for example, has sought to revive the Guarantee
Clause'33 as a textual basis for checks on federal authority.' 3
Merritt's basic argument is that the Guarantee Clause has "two
aspects":
On the one hand, the clause prohibits the states from adopting nonrepublican forms of government. On the other hand,
as long as the states adhere to republican principles, the
clause forbids the federal government from interfering with
in a way that would destroy their republistate governments
35
can character.
Although Merritt acknowledges the radically open-ended character of the Clause's language,"3 6 she uses it to derive relatively
ability to interfere with state govrigorous limits on Congress's
37
ernmental processes.
Merritt acknowledges that the Guarantee Clause "may simply
be the 'textual embodiment' of structural concerns reflected in
the Constitution as a whole."1 8 This is an important point: The
Guarantee Clause does seem explicitly to authorize interpreters
to import broad principles of political theory-that is, what is a
"republican" government?-into the Constitution.13 9 Interpreters
may then use the implications of such theory to decide cases
that were not more specifically addressed in the text, in precisely

133. U.S. CONST: art. IV, § 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in
this Union a Republican Form of Government .
134. See Merritt, supra note 124, at 36-70.
135. Id. at 25.
136. Merritt quotes, for example, John Adams's confession "that he 'never understood' what the guarantee clause meant and 'believe[d] no man ever did or ever
will.'" Id. at 23 (quoting Letter from John Adams to Mercy Warren (July 20, 1807)).
137. See id. at 36-70.
138. Id. at 2 n.8 (quoting Henry Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law,
89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 13 n.72 (1975)).
139. Similarly, the Seventh Amendment's reference to trials "at common law" has
allowed Courts to consult the common law background in order to decide whether a
jury is required in any given sort of case. See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996).
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the same way that Justice Kennedy used the implications of
dual sovereignty in his Term Limits concurrence.140
Although Merritt emphasizes the importance of grounding
federalism doctrines in a specific textual provision, 4 1 it is hard
to see what is textualist about Merritt's discussion. Once debate
comes down to particular cases, Merritt's argument moves very
quickly to determining what aspects of state power are "an essential component of state sovereignty." 4 2 At this point, the
work of interpretation in any disputed case is being done by the
interpreter's theoretical conception of what constitutes a "republican" government. In other words, the Guarantee
Clause is at
4
most a textual mandate for structural argument.1 3
Similar things can be said of a third approach, put forward in
an important article by Gary Lawson and Patricia Granger.' 4 '
Lawson and Granger argue that the word "proper" in the Necessary and Proper Clause-or the "Sweeping" Clause, as the
Antifederalists christened it--"serves as a textual guardian of
principles of separation of powers, principles of federalism, and
unenumerated individual rights."4 5 Their approach is surely
textualist in that they focus on evidence of contemporary usage
in the founding era in order to establish that "proper" had a
"jurisdictional" meaning, that is, "that a 'proper' law is one that
is within the peculiarjurisdictionor responsibilityof the relevant
government actor."46 The Sweeping Clause thus requires, inter
alia, that federal law "must respect the system of enumerated
federal powers: executory laws may not regulate or prohibit

140. See infra notes 224-25 and accompanying text.
141. See Merritt, supra note 124, at 21 n.118 ("It is preferable to rest determination of federalism issues on a specific constitutional command, such as the guarantee
clause, than on notions of political accountability that find no support in the constitutional text.").
142. Id. at 36, 36-40 (discussing control over the franchise).
143. See, e.g., id. at 40 (arguing that "[tihe guarantee clause provides a convenient
anchor" for the structural principle that the Constitution protects "the necessary
existence of the States").
144. See Lawson & Granger, supra note 59.
145. Id. at 271-72; see also id. at 270 (arguing that the Sweeping Clause imposes
"internal, textual limits" on the Article I powers).
146. Id. at 291-314.
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activities that fall outside the subject areas specifically enumerated in the Constitution." 147
I have no particular quarrel with any of this, but the idea that
Congress must not exceed its enumerated powers does not
decide many cases on its own. As Lawson and Granger acknowledge, the question "whether executory laws that regulate subjects within Congress's enumerated powers but that significantly
impair the autonomy of state governments can be 'improper' because such laws contravene constitutionally 'proper' principles of
federalism" is "even thornier" than the issue of defining the
limits of those enumerated powers in the first place.1' Indeed,
the two issues may not be all that distinct. Justice O'Connor
argued in New York that the questions whether an act of Congress fits under an enumerated power and whether that act "invades the province of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth
Amendment" are "mirror images of each other.... [f a power
is an attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth
Amendment, it is necessarily a power the Constitution has not
conferred on Congress." 4 9 The upshot is that no court can evaluate whether Congress has acted "within its jurisdiction" without
employing 'freestanding conceptions of state sovereignty.'" 5
Lawson and Granger thus concede that "the Court might have
a license-and a duty-to employ such conceptions of sovereignty
when measuring congressional authority under the Sweeping
Clause."1 51 And while they argue that "under a jurisdictional
construction of the Sweeping Clause, executory laws must be consistent with principles of separation of powers, principles of federalism, and individual rights,"15 Lawson and Granger do not assert that the meaning of "proper" can itself give content to those
principles. In this sense, their theory is functionally similar to
those put forward by Professors Rappaport and Merritt: "proper"
here serves as a textual warrant for structuralanalysis.

147. Id. at 331.
148. Id. at 332.
149. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155-56 (1992) (citations omitted).
150. Lawson & Granger, supra note 59, at 332 (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550 (1985)).
151. Id. at 332-33.
152. Id. at 297.
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It bears emphasis that if these theories do no more than
this-that is, provide a textualist hook for structural arguments-they will have served an important function. Nor do I
wish to criticize any substantive view of federalism that may be
implicit in any of these approaches. My point is simply to say
that these theories are not "textualist" in the sense that the text
itself supplies the content for a theory of federalism protected by
the Constitution. These theories thus emphasize the extent to
which structural analysis has displaced textualism in the context of federalism. I consider Alden's contribution to that ongoing discussion in the next Part.
III. THE STRUCTURAL JURISPRUDENCE OF "BIG IDEAS"
It may be possible to interpret Alden's atextualism not as a
form of specific intent originalism but rather as a form of structural argument. The majority may fairly be read as proposing
the existence of a structural principle of immunity not resident
in any particular textual provision, but rather immanent in the
Constitution's overall organization. Justice Kennedy's historical
discussion is thus directed not toward defining the original understanding of any particular term in the constitutional text, but
rather the original understanding of the general structure constructed by the document.
Structural argument is hardly new in constitutional interpretation. 5 3 What seems distinctive about Justice Kennedy's approach is its reliance on sovereign immunity as a concept drawn
from the history of legal and political theory to illuminate the
meaning of the constitutional plan. Particular pieces of historical evidence-such as statements by the Framers in the ratification debates or The Federalist-areemployed to confirm the
presence of the broad principle. But it is the principle itself, in
the absence of direct historical evidence on the question before
the Court, that does most of the work in deciding the case.

153. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 426-28 (1819) (arguing that state power to tax federal institutions would unduly interfere with federal
supremacy); see also CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRuCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTIUTIONAL LAW 4-5 (1969); BOBBITr, supra note 90, at 74-92.
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In order to highlight the distinctive aspect of Justice Kennedy's approach, I begin this Part by sketching two more familjar forms of structural argument: the structural aspects of what
William Eskridge has called "the new textualism,"'" and the
more open-ended structuralism of Charles Black. 5 5 I then develop the basic outlines of Justice Kennedy's particular style of
structural argument. This approach, I argue, provides the most
satisfactory way of looking not only at Alden, but at other recent
federalism cases such as Printz, New York, and Term Limits.
Moreover, this approach helps overcome some of the weaknesses
that plague more familiar forms of structural argument.
A. Structure of Text
It would be unfair to suggest that Alden's focus on structure is
necessarily inconsistent with textualism. In many instances,
structural arguments are an integral part of the textualist enterprise. As Justice Scalia has observed:
Statutory construction... is a holistic endeavor. A provision
that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the
remainder of the statutory scheme-because the same terminology is used elsewhere in a context that makes its meaning
clear, or because only one of the permissible meanings proeffect that is compatible with the rest of
duces a 1substantive
56
the law.

William Eskridge's influential study of the "new textualism" unpacks Justice Scalia's analysis into three distinct aspects. First,
the textualist "will consider how the word or phrase is used elsewhere in the same statute, or how it is used in other statutes.""7
Thisidea, which Akhil Amar has called "intratextualism,"'5 8 stems
from a familiar canon of statutory construction that-at least in
its traditional, relatively weak form-is generally uncontroversial.

154. See Eskridge, supra note 86.
155. See BLACl, supra note 153.
156. United Say. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371
(1988) (citations omitted).
157. Eskridge, supra note 86, at 661.
158. Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REv. 747 (1999).
159. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 484 (1990); Helvering v. Stockholms
Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. 84, 87 (1934). Professor Amar has advocated what appears

1632

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:1601

A second way in which textualists use structure is to "consider

how the possible meanings [of a given term] fit with the statute
as a whole."160 One might ask, for example, whether a possible
meaning for a statutory term is consistent with the statute's
overall approach to a problem, or whether that meaning will
render other provisions irrational or superfluous.16 ' Third, a
textualist "will rely on the interaction of different statutory
schemes to determine statutory plain meaning." 6 ' This aspect
expands the interpretive focus beyond the immediate statute
being construed in an effort to achieve overall coherence in a
particular area of the law.
Although the primary application of these principles has been
in the context of statutory construction, nothing inherently precludes their use in constitutional interpretation as well. A judge
seeking the meaning of a particular term in the Constitution
frequently can compare the provision at issue to another provision using similar language,163 or he may attempt to situate
the term in question within a broader set of constitutional purposes and principles.' 6 And although there is only one Constitution, it is not unheard of for judges to interpret particular constitutional provisions in order to achieve coherence with statutory
enactments-especially those enacted contemporaneously with
the Constitution by a 65Congress that included many of the
Constitution's Framers.

to be a much stronger form of intratextualism, which may be more problematic.
Compare Vermeule & Young, supra note 103 passim (criticizing Amar's approach),
with Michael J. Gerhardt, The Utility and Significance of Professor Amar's Holistic
Reasoning, 87 GEO. L.J. 2327, 2344-45 (1999) (reviewing AMAR, supra note 8) (praising Amar's method).
160. Eskridge, supra note 86, at 661.
161. See id.
162. Id. at 662.
163. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 422 (1819) (comparing "necessary" in the Necessary and Proper Clause with "needful" in Article IV, § 3).
164. See id. at 415 (arguing that 'necessary" must be construed in the context of
"a constitution, intended ... to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs").
165. See id. at 401-02 (suggesting that the scope of Congress's implied powers must
be construed in light of the first Congress's decision, after extensive constitutional
debate, to create a national bank); see also Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,
77-78 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the scope of the Eleventh Amendment should be construed in light of the federal statutes conferring exclusive jurisdiction on federal courts for certain types of cases, including copyright and bankruptcy).
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The starting point for each of these structural elements within
textualism, however, is a particular piece of text. Structure informs the meaning of text, but structure does not operate of its
own force without some textual hook. For this reason, Justice
Kennedy's use of structure in Alden cannot be assimilated to
textualism. And as Alden itself suggests, the dependence of the
textualist approach on particular constitutional language makes
it difficult for the textualist to capture fully certain constitutional
values.
Some values that seem clearly to have been important to the
Framers, for example, have no particular referents in the constitutional text. Whether or not it can justify the Court's result,
Justice Kennedy's historical discussion in Alden is surely persuasive to the extent of demonstrating that sovereign immunity
was an important concept to the Framers, even prior to the
Eleventh Amendment. And yet there is absolutely no textual
provision in the original Constitution giving voice to this value.
Similarly, even those skeptical about state sovereign immunity
frequently consider the Constitution to embody a principle of
federal sovereign immunity despite the total impossibility of
locating that principle in any particular textual provision.1 66
Other implications from the structural concept of sovereignty
-such as Congress's plenary power over aliens' 67 -- likewise exist
without any textual warrant.
Perhaps even more significant, the most important changes in
the constitutional structure over the course of our history seem
to have occurred largely without any substantial alterations in
166. See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1002 (4th ed. 1996) ("Despite the Constitution's
silence on immunity...

, early Supreme Court decisions assumed that the United

States could not be sued eo nomine absent congressional consent.").
167. See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603 (1889) (establishing the plenary power doctrine). More broadly, Justice Sutherland argued in
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936), that the
federal government's power over foreign affairs derived from the inherent nature of
sovereignty rather than the constitutional text. One need not accept Justice
Sutherland's argument in its entirety to agree on the importance of structural argument in this context. See generally Sarah H. Cleveland, The Plenary Power Background of Curtiss-Wright, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1127, 1135 (1999) (discussing "the
theory of an extraconstitutional foreign affairs authority, derived from concepts of
international law and sovereignty, and not clearly subject to traditional constitutional
constraints or to judicial review, which found ultimate expression in Curtiss-Wright").
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the constitutional text. The New Deal's revolution in the size
and scope of federal power vis-A-vis the states left no textual
footprint in the Constitution itself.6 Similarly, the advent of the
modern administrative state-which fundamentally altered the
constitutional separation of powers at the federal level-also
occurred without any modification in the relevant textual provisions. 169 These developments suggest that any approach to structure that depends exclusively
on tying structure to text is likely
170
to miss a very great deal.

B. Structure and Relationship
The most prominent alternative approach to structure would
alleviate this problem by recognizing that, although the constitutional structure ultimately is created by text, that structure once
created may have legal force of its own rather than simply informing the interpretation of particular textual provisions. This
approach is developed most prominently in the White Lectures
on Citizenship given by Charles Black in 1968.17' Black was

troubled by
The great extent to which, in dealing with questions of constitutional law, we have preferred the method of purported
explication or exegesis of the particular textual passage...
as opposed to the method of inference from the structures
and relationships created by the constitution in all its parts
or in some principal part. 172

168. See 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 346 (1998).
169. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEWING THE
REGULATORY STATE 23-30 (1990).

170. Professor Rappaport suggests a different relationship between text and structure whereby structural arguments, as well as the purpose and history of the constitutional provision at issue, are used to resolve ambiguities in the text. See
Rappaport, supra note 86, at 823. But to say this seems little more than to say that
text should be consulted first, and that other theories are necessary if the text provides no clear answer. I doubt many proponents of other interpretive theories would
disagree with that proposition. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 108, at 1195.
171. See BLACK, supra note 153.
172. Id. at 7.
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According to Philip Bobbitt, Professor Black's lectures "created
anew the structural form." 173 As Bobbitt describes Black's method,
it combines "deceptively simple logical moves from the entire
Constitutional text rather than from one of its parts" with "a
macroscopic prudentialism... arising from general assertions
about power and social choice."' 4 Black began with the example
of Carringtonv. Rash,7 5 a 1965 decision involving a Texas constitutional provision barring military personnel from voting in
any Texas county unless they resided in that county at the time
they entered the service. 176 The Warren Court struck down the
1 77
provision as irrational under the Equal Protection Clause;
Black, by contrast, would have rested the decision on the structural principle that "no state may annex any disadvantage simply and solely to the performance of a federal duty." 78 Rather
than strain the particular text of the Equal Protection Clause to
vindicate this principle, Black would have had the Court simply
infer the principle directly from the overall federal structure
established by the Constitution.7 9
Black's primary concern was to defend the results reached by
the Warren Court by offering more satisfactory grounds for the
decisions than those the Court had articulated. 8 ' He accordingly
focused less on the classic questions of constitutional structure-the extent of national power under federalism and the
relationship of the federal branches under the constitutional
separation of powes-than on developing structural explanations for some of the Supreme Court's more dramatic expansions
of individual rights. 8 ' So, for example, Black defended the appli-

173. BOBBITr, supra note 90, at 77.

174. Id. at 74.
175. 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
176. See id. at 89.
177. See id. at 96-97.
178. BLACK, supra note 153, at 11.
179. See id. at 9-12.
180. See BOBBrIT, supra note 90, at 77.
181. See id. at 79 (noting that, for Black, the key structural relationships were "the
electorate's assigned central role in the federal government; the existence of a federal
court system as one of the agencies for redress of citizens' grievances; 'the economic
structure of nationhood'; the structure of 'national unity'; [and] the concept of
'citizenship'").
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cation of the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause to state
governments not via some form of "incorporation" theory, but
rather by arguing that "the nature of the federal government,
and of the states' relations to it, compels the inference of some
federal constitutional protection for free speech." 82 That, Black
explained, is because "petition and assembly for the discussion
of national governmental measures are rights founded on the
very nature of a national government running on public opinion." 18' Black thus concluded that "the First Amendment is only

evidentiary of what would in any case be reasonably obvious. " "
For Black, the primary virtue of the structural approach was
that "to succeed it has to make sense-current, practical
sense."18 5 Structural argument plunges lawyers immediately into
"the practicalities and proprieties of the thing, without getting
out dictionaries whose entries will not really respond to the
question we are putting, or scanning utterances, contemporary
with the text, of persons who did not really face the question we
are asking."186 By relying on structural argument, Black emphasized, "[wie
will have to deal with policy and not with gram187
mar."
By drawing operative rules directly from structure, rather
than restricting structural argument to the role of informing
interpretation of particular texts, Black achieved far greater
flexibility than the textualists would accord to structural argument. Unlike the textualists, Black was able to give voice to
values that he saw as immanent in the constitutional structure,
even if not tied to any particular textual provision. It is a commonplace of constitutional argument, however, that helpful
flexibility quickly shades over into troubling indeterminacy.
Black's ability time and again to justify morally appealing re-

182. BLACK, supra note 153, at 39.
183. Id. at 41.

184. Id.
185. Id. at 22; see also BOBBrIT, supra note 90, at 85 ("[Olne good reason for
adopting structural approaches is that they are more satisfying, being truer approxi-

mations of the interaction of actual reasons yielding actual results than are doctrinal
or textual approaches. We share a constitutional sense and we use it.").
186. BLACK, supra note 153, at 22-23.
187. Id. at 23.
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suts on structural grounds might, after a while, give rise to the
suspicion that a sufficiently skillful structuralist can justify any
result he pleases. 8 8
Moreover, Black's emphasis on "the practicalities and proprieties of the thing" may systematically downplay some kinds of
structural values. In Commodity Futures Trading Commission v.
Schor,89 for example, Justice O'Connor applied a similarly pragmatic approach in construing the limits of Congress's authority
to assign judicial business to administrative tribunals rather
than to Article III courts. 9 ° In dissent, Justice Brennan argued
against weighing "the legislative interest in convenience and
efficiency... against the competing interest in judicial independence." 9 ' Justice Brennan opposed such a balancing test because
the pragmatic interests of convenience and efficiency are "immediate, concrete, and easily understood," whereas the benefit of
judicial independence is "almost entirely prophylactic, and thus
often seem[s] remote and not worth the cost in any single
case."192 Similarly, Laurence Tribe has warned that the greatest
threat to structural principles of federalism is "the tyranny of
small decisions"-each of which may make pragmatic sense on
its own merits-that ultimately leave the federalism principle as
nothing but "a gutted shell."9 3

188. See id. at 24-26 (arguing that the "unhallowed 'state action' doctrine" should
not apply to rights derived from the constitutional structure); id. at 28-29 (justifying
the right to travel recognized in Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941), as "a
consequence of [Edwards's] being one of the people in a unitary nation, to
which ... internal barriers to travel are unthinkable, rather than pretending that I
have performed a warranted inference from a clause empowering Congress to regulate commerce among the several states"); id. at 65 (concluding that "in the status
of the national citizen ... as political participant, as warranted claimant to mem-"
bership in the public life, as free man, there might have been found much the same
immunities as those we have perilously worked out from the fifty-two word text [of
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment]"); cf BOBBrrT, supra note 90, at 85 (suggesting that Black's ability to come up with ingenious structural arguments to justify
Warren Court results gave rise to a "weaker form" of "the indeterminacy argument").
The manipulability problem plagues certain forms of structured textualism as well.
See, e.g., Vermeule & Young, supra note 103, at 767-69 (criticizing Professor Amar's
intratextual approach for loosening the constraints on judges).
189. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
190. See id. at 847-59.
191. Id. at 863 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
192. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
193. TRIBE, supra note 34, § 5-20, at 381.
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Taken together, then, the textualist and Blackian approaches
frame the central question for structural constitutional interpretation: How can one formulate a structural interpretive method
flexible enough to give voice to constitutional values that are
only indirectly recognized in the text itself, without rendering
the method so indeterminate that it simply mirrors the preferences of the interpreter? And how does one ensure that the
method's pragmatism--one of structuralism's central virtues
-does not eliminate the "Ulysses-tied-to-the-mast" quality of
constitutionalism that shields enduring constitutional values
from short-term expediency?' 94
Some of Justice Kennedy's argument in Alden seems Blackian
in character. In particular, Justice Kennedy's discussion of the
practical ways in which subjecting states to liability threatens
their ability to perform their own governmental functions 9 5 has
important affinities with Black, although it is employed in the
service of a rather different end from the ones Black typically
espoused. But Kennedy's broader structural argument in Alden
is much different. Those differences, as I hope to show in the
next section, go a long way toward addressing the central questions of structural interpretation that I have raised.
C. Justice Kennedy's Structuralism
I began this Part by describing Justice Kennedy's approach in
Alden as relying primarily upon the original understanding of
the general structure created by the Constitution.'9 6 This de-

194. On Ulysses and the Constitution (and their relationship to certain experiments
on pigeons), see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 1 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 1-8, at 2224 (3d ed. 2000).
195. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2264-65 (1999).
196. As I hope to make clear in this section and the next Part, Justice Kennedy is
neither the originator of this approach nor always its most proficient practitioner.
See infra text accompanying notes 226-45. But the approach has achieved a particular prominence in Justice Kennedy's recent federalism opinions, perhaps because of
his position as a "swing vote" in this area of the law. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker,
Interdisciplinary Due Diligence: The Case for Common Sense in the Search for the
Swing Justice, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 187, 202 (1996) (predicting that "one might expect
Justice Kennedy.. . to be the Court's 'most powerful' Justice on matters of federalism") (citation omitted); id. at 203-06 (concluding that this prediction is borne out by
statistical analysis of the 1994 and 1995 terms).
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scription suggests that we might distinguish this method from
structured textualism and Blackian structuralism by focusing on
two aspects of Justice Kennedy's method. First, Justice Kennedy's structural arguments differ from their textualist cousins
by focusing on the federal structure as a whole rather than the
structure of particular textual provisions. Second, Justice Kennedy diverges from Professor Black by emphasizing the historical understanding of the Constitution's structure rather than its
present-day imperatives. The Court's method in Alden thus
stands in the same relation to constitutional structure as an
original meaning approach does to constitutional text.
The comparison to original meaning or understanding immediately raises a problem, however. The trick with original meaning is to keep it from shading back into original intent. We are
supposed to ask, for example, "What did the generation that
ratified the Fourteenth Amendment understand 'equal protection' to mean?" rather than "Did they intend to dismantle
segregated schools?" This helps avoid or mitigate some of the
standard criticisms of originalism, such as the frequent absence
of direct evidence about what the truly relevant decision makers
-the ratifiers of constitutional provisions, not their drafters 9
-thought about particular questions, or the frequent inability of
the ratifying generation
to foresee particular questions that
19 8
might arise later on.
The problem is that original meaning and intent are frequently
hard to separate, especially where the same sorts of evidence
would be used to divine both. The paradigmatic original meaning argument would be to cite dictionary definitions from the
period in which the provision at issue was ratified to demonstrate that a particular word was understood in a particular way
at that time."' The problem, of course, is that most words worth
197. See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353,
375 n.130 (1981) (acknowledging the dearth of direct evidence concerning the intentions of the ratifiers at each state convention); Ronald D. Rotunda, Original Intent,
the View of the Framers, and the Role of the Ratifiers, 41 VAND. L. REV. 507, 512
(1988) (arguing that it is the ratifiers that really count).
198. Focusing on original meaning of the words likewise avoids criticisms stemming
from the difficulties of determining collective intentions or of separating interpretive
"hopes" from "expectations." See Fallon, supra note 108, at 1211-12.
199. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585-86 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
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arguing over have-and have always had-a variety of meanings
at any given time, and the dictionary itself cannot help us much
in choosing between them.200 The real question is almost always
what the term meant in the context of the political debate over
the constitutional provision in question. For that, we naturally
turn to the statements of the provision's framers and ratifiers-the same sources in which we might seek evidence of those
framers' and ratifiers' original intent. °1
If anything, focusing on the original understanding of structure rather than text would seem to exacerbate this problem.
Because we are not working with any particular piece of text, we
cannot even begin by going to contemporaneous dictionaries.
And any halfway-cynical law student could take the questions
that an intentionalist might ask in cases like Alden or Printz
("Did the Founders intend to subject a state to suit in its own
courts?" and "Did they think Congress could commandeer executive officials?") and reformulate them as issues of original understanding ("Did the Founders understand Congress's powers to
include the power to subject a state to suits in its own courts?"
and "Did they understand the constitutional structure to permit
indirect federal action through state officers?"). Obviously nothing has changed in these different formulations.
In Alden, the originalist's problem is further complicated by
the fact that not only is there no specific text to interpret,0 2
concurring) (citing a definition from the 1773 edition of Samuel Johnson's famous
Dictionary of the English Language in support of the proposition that "[a]t the time
the original Constitution was ratified, 'commerce' consisted of selling, buying, and
bartering, as well as transporting for these purposes").
200. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 355 (1819) (pointing
out that "necessary" was commonly understood to have more than one definition in

the Founding era).
201. Some critics of originalism have suggested that the slide from original meaning to original intent may be more sinister than this-that is, that the proponents of
original meaning have been intentionalists in disguise all along. See, e.g., Douglas
Laycock, Book Review, 101 Ethics 661-63 (1991) (reviewing BORK, supra note 109). I
am less interested in this question than in whether the slide could be prevented by
fine-tuning the approach to originalist interpretation. If it can, and if the method
employed to do so is sufficiently transparent as to expose any attempt to substitute
intent for meaning to criticism, then it seems that we would have come a long way
toward allaying the critics' concerns.
202. Leaving aside those instances in which Congress acts pursuant to Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, the power to subject states to suit under federal law
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there is also no specific evidence of the Framers' specific intentions. As Justice Kennedy acknowledged, there is simply no
evidence that the Framers ever specifically addressed the possibility that Congress might want to preempt the states' immunity
in their own courts. 3 The Alden Court's solution to all these
difficulties is to employ a broad theory of sovereign immunity
that the Constitution is thought to embody. This resolution has
two steps. First, the Court demonstrates that sovereign immunity
was part of the background of legal principles against which the
Constitution was drafted and ratified.20 4 Second, the Court demonstrates that subjecting the states to suit in their own courts
would be inconsistent with this largely uncodified set of background norms."
This is what I mean by a jurisprudence of "big ideas." While
the textual provisions bearing upon a case like Alden are sparse
indeed, sovereign immunity is itself a highly robust principle. It
has a well-developed history, with extensive commentary and
case law fleshing out its implications across a wide range of
circumstances.20 6 Once the Court determines that the Framers
believed the states to possess sovereign immunity, the Court is
able to draw upon the established corpus of sovereign immunity
law and theory to identify answers to any number of potential
issues not directly addressed by the text itself. The underlying
"big idea"-whether it is sovereign immunity, dual sovereignty,
or something else-remains external to the views of the Framers
themselves on particular questions. This fact seems likely to
help keep the original understanding of structure from collapswould be an implied power incident to the power to make federal law in the first
place. As I have noted, one might say a court is interpreting the word "proper" in
delimiting the appropriate scope of such implied powers, see supra text accompanying notes 144-52, but that inquiry very quickly collapses into a general structural
analysis.
203. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2260 (1999) (acknowledging "the
founders' silence" on this particular question).
204. See id. at 2247 ("The generation that designed and adopted our federal system
considered immunity from private suits central to sovereign dignity.").
205. See id. at 2263-66.
206. See,

e.g.,

3

WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,

CoMIMENTARIES

*254-*265;

Edwin

M.

Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, VI, 36 YALE L.J. 1 (1926); Louis L.
Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1963).
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ing back into an inquiry about the Framers' original intent on
particular questions.
The "big ideas" approach may provide the best explanation not
only for Alden, but also for other significant federalism cases.
Certainly this form of argument has become an important feature of Justice Kennedy's jurisprudence in the federalism area.
The best pre-Alden example is the juxtaposition of Term Limits 20 7 and Lopez,20 the two most significant federalism decisions
of the 1994 term. Lopez, of course, was a potentially revolutionary victory for states' rights in that it imposed, for the first time
since the New Deal, an outer limit on Congress's legislative
authority to regulate private conduct under the Commerce
Clause. 20 9 Term Limits, on the other hand, was a significant
victory for federal supremacy in that the Court struck down the
State of Arkansas's attempt to impose term limits on its federal
representatives.2 1 ° Justice Kennedy was the swing vote in each
of these 5-4 decisions, and in each he offered a separate concurring opinion that underlines the importance of "big ideas" theory
in construing the structural constitution.
Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Lopez is centrally concerned
with justifying the very idea of judicially enforceable federalism
limits on Congress's authority. 11 The Garcia case, after all, had

207. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
208. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
209. See Young, State Sovereign Immunity, supra note 48, at 43-47 (arguing that
preservation of the states' authority to regulate private conduct is the most important function of federalism doctrine). There has been considerable debate since Lopez
as to whether that decision was simply a one-time shot across Congress's bow or a
lasting recommitment to judicial review under the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., Jenna
Bednar & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the Court's "Unsteady Path": A Theory
of Judicial Enforcement of Federalism, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1447, 1484 (1995) (taking
the former view). The Court has two commerce power cases before it this term
which should help resolve this debate. See United States v. Jones, 178 F.3d 479 (7th
Cir.), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 494 (1999) (concerning whether application of the
federal arson statute to destruction of residential property falls outside the commerce
power); Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst., 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir.) (en banc),
cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 11 (1999) (concerning
the constitutionality of the Violence Against Women Act); see also Young, State Sovereign Immunity, supra note 48, at 73-79 (discussing the federalism cases set to be
decided this term).
210. See Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 837-38.
211. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568-83 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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previously all but renounced such judicial interference in relations between the nation and the states.21 2 Justice Kennedy's
rebuttal to Garcia began by conceding the impropriety of the
pre-New Deal Court's attempts to define the reach of the commerce power through common law doctrinal elaboration. 213 The
old Court, in his view, improperly sought to "draw content-based
or subject-matter distinctions, thus defining by semantic or formalistic categories those activities that were commerce and
those that were not."2 14 Justice Kennedy likewise rejected the
analysis of Justice Thomas's separate concurrence, which urged
a return to the narrow original meaning of "commerce."' 15 Instead, Justice Kennedy concluded that the Court's obligation to
safeguard "the stability of our Commerce Clause jurispruof
dence.., forecloses us from reverting to an understanding
2 16
economy."
18th-century
an
only
serve
would
that
commerce
Where originalism and common law doctrine had failed, Justice Kennedy turned to structure and theory. Judicial enforcement is appropriate, Justice Kennedy argued, because federalism is of equal dignity with other structural principles enforced
through judicial review; indeed, "federalism was the unique
contribution of the Framers to political science and political
theory."217 Even more important, federalism is central to the
Framers' theory of political accountability. "Were the Federal
Government to take over the regulation of entire areas of traditional state concern, areas having nothing to do with the regulation of commercial activities," Justice Kennedy worried, "the
boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority
218
would blur and political responsibility would become illusory."
The case for judicial review, then, rests explicitly on the place of

212. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550-51, 554
(1985); see also William W. Van Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism, 83 MICH.
L. REV. 1709 (1985) (criticizing Garcia).
213. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 574-75 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
214. Id. at 569 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
215. See id. at 585-93 (Thomas, J., concurring).
216. Id. at 574 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
217. Id. at 575 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting judicial enforcement of separation
of powers, checks and balances, and judicial review); see also Garcia, 469 U.S. at
567 n.12 (making the same observation).
218. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 577 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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the federal structure not so much in the Constitution's text, but
in the abstract political theory developed by the Framers that
undergirds the text.
The focus is even more sharply on political theory in Justice
Kennedy's Term Limits concurrence. While Justice Stevens's
majority and Justice Thomas's dissent each engaged in more
traditional textual and originalist analysis of Article I's Qualifications Clauses,21 9 Justice Kennedy emphasized more abstract
"fundamental principles of federalism."22 ° "It was the genius of
[the Framers'] idea," Justice Kennedy observed, "that our citizens would have two political capacities, one state and one federal, each protected from incursion by the other."221 The result,

he concluded, is that each order of government has "its own
direct relationship, its own privity, its own set of mutual rights
and obligations to the people who sustain it and are governed by
it." 222 This principle is grounded in history, but it is the history

of ideas-not the historical understanding of a particular constitutional provision or the specific views of the Framers on a
particular legal question.2
Once Justice Kennedy determined that the federal government's relationship with the people is not mediated by state
governments, it followed that "the National Government is, and
must be, controlled by the people without collateral interference
by the States."224 This proposition---for Justice Kennedy, at
least-decided the case: "Nothing in the Constitution," he declared, "supports the idea of state interference with the most
basic relation between the National Government and its citizens,
the selection of legislative representatives." 225 With or without

the Qualifications Clause, one suspects that the political theory

219. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl.2; id. art. I, § 3, cl.3.
220. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
221. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
222. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
223. See, e.g., GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 17761787, at 344-89 (1969) (chronicling the development of sovereignty theory in the
thought of the founding generation between 1776 and 1789).
224. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 841 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
225. Id. at 842 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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of dual sovereignty would compel the conclusion that state gov226
ernments cannot set qualifications for federal representatives.
One can detect similar reasoning at work in other keystone
opinions of the "federalist revival"-even those penned by justices
known for quite different interpretive methodologies. Justice
O'Connor's jurisprudence, for example, is noted more frequently
for pragmatic attention to context than for abstraction. 2 7 In New
York v. United States, 228 however, she chose to anchor the anticommandeering principle in the Framers' decision-fully articu-

lated in their political theory but not obviously embodied in any
constitutional text-to create a national government acting

directly on individuals rather than employing the states as instruments of regulation.2 29 Similarly, Justice Scalia, normally a
proponent of the original understanding of constitutional text,
accepts this abstract rationale as the primary basis for extending the anticommandeering principle in Printz.11 Indeed, the
dueling opinions in Printz dramatize the extent to which political theory has replaced text and original understanding by parsing the abstract discussions in The Federalist as carefully as a
tax opinion might parse the Internal Revenue Code. 1
226. There is the additional wrinkle on the facts of Term Limits itself that the
people of Arkansas-not the state government acting through its normal processes
-had set the qualifications by popular referendum. See id. at 883 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Although Justice Kennedy did not respond to this point directly in his
concurrence, his likely answer is evident from his emphasis on the fact that when
the people of a state vote in a federal election, "they act in a federal capacity and
exercise a federal right." Id. at 842 (Kennedy, J., concurring). He would thus likely
respond to Justice Thomas by asserting that, in passing the term limits initiative,
the people of Arkansas acted in their state capacity, exercising a state right, and
were thus powerless to constrain choices they might later wish to make when acting
in their federal capacity. My point is not to resolve whether such a response ultimately would be persuasive, but to suggest that Justice Kennedy would approach
the issue in rather abstract terms.
227. See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543, 592-613 (1986).
228. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
229. See id. at 161-66.
230. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918 (1997) (relying on structural
arguments due to lack of applicable text and inconclusive historical practice); id. at
918-19 ("[Tihe Framers rejected the concept of a central government that would act
upon and through the States, and instead designed a system in which the State and
Federal Governments would exercise concurrent authority over the people-who were,
in Hamilton's words, 'the only proper objects of government.'").
231. See id. at 912-16 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 109 (Alexander Hamil-
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With these examples in front of us it becomes possible to
make some additional observations about this sort of "big idea"
structuralism. First, it is tempting to see the difference between
a specific intention on a particular issue-say, whether the
states may intervene in the selection of federal representatives-and a general theory of dual sovereignty that resolves
that question as a function of differing levels of generality.23 2
But the "big ideas" approach as used in the federalism cases
maps imperfectly onto this familiar concept. In Term Limits, for
instance, Justice Kennedy's dual sovereignty theory is surely
more abstract and "general" than most of the historical trench
warfare waged between Justice Stevens's majority opinion and
Justice Thomas's dissent.2"' In Alden, however, the "big idea" is
sovereign immunity, a hoary common law concept with innumerable details, quirks, and qualifications. 2" The utility of tapping
into a concept like common law sovereign immunity is not that
it is more "general" than the text of the Eleventh Amendment or
the set of issues debated in the ratification conventions; rather,

ton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)); id. at 970-76 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also
Eskridge, supra note 84, at 1307 (noting that in Printz, Justice Scalia "relied on The
Federalist to establish that the Constitution was meant to prohibit [commandeering
state officers], both as specifically understood by at least one framer and as generally
understood from the constitutional principle or spirit of dual sovereignty") (footnotes
omitted); Rappaport, supra note 86, at 828-29 (criticizing Printz's methodology from a
textualist perspective).
232. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 100 (1991) (observing that "historical traditions, like rights themselves, exist
at various levels of generality"); Fallon, supra note 108, at 1198-99 (distinguishing
between "specific" and "abstract" forms of the Framers' intent).
233. For a taste of the Verdun-esque clash between Justices Stevens and Thomas,
compare U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 816-17 (1995) (discussing
the 1807 controversy over the qualifications of Representative William McCreery),
with id. at 915-16 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (chastising the majority for not digging
deeply enough into the historical record on this point).
234. As I discuss further in Part V, see infra text accompanying notes 301-33, Justice Kennedy actually invokes two different conceptions of sovereign immunity in
Alden-the common law kind and a "natural law" version which is indeed quite abstract or "general." See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2248, 2257 (1999); see
also id. at 2270 (Souter, J., dissenting) (disentangling the two strands of the
majority's reasoning). But Justice Kennedy's mistake in Alden was not in relying
partly on a concrete, specific doctrine like the common law version of sovereign immunity; rather, it is in failing to keep the two sorts of sovereign immunity straight.
See infra text accompanying notes 315-28.
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the point is that sovereign immunity doctrine had been elaborated across a broader range of circumstances than were directly
addressed by the Constitution's framers and ratifiers in the
course of their debates. For that reason, sovereign immunity
doctrine-and the extant authority concerning the treatment of
common law doctrine generally2 5-- was able to provide quite
specific answers in Alden when the text and the Framers' specific
understandings could not.
Argument from "big ideas" also differs from levels of generality
analysis in another respect. Because the level of generality at
which a problem is evaluated can have a powerful impact on the
outcome, 236 a number of Justices and commentators have discussed how to choose the appropriate level. Many seem to have
concluded that, unless the interpreter is willing to commit to a
default rule of always choosing the most specific level of generality possible, there is no way of choosing an appropriate level
without making some kind of substantive value choice.237 The
"big ideas" interpreter, on the other hand, is bound to employ

235. For Justice Souter, Alden (and Seminole Tribe) should have been decided not
based on the implications of common law sovereign immunity doctrine itself, but on
the extensive and quite specific body of law and principle that had grown up around
the question of how to treat common law doctrines imported from the mother country. See infra text accompanying notes 311-17. These "reception" doctrines became,
on the dissenters' view, an essential component of any common law doctrine like
sovereign immunity once it was imported into the United States.
236. Compare, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) (defining the
right asserted as the right to engage in homosexual sodomy), with id. at 199
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (defining the relevant right more generally as "the right
to be let alone" (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting))).
237. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 128 n.6 (1989) (Scalia, J.)
("Because ... general traditions provide such imprecise guidance, they permit judges
to dictate rather than discern the society's views."); Fallon, supra note 108, at 1217
("Once a consistent adherence to the framers' specific intent is renounced, there
simply is no value-neutral way to choose among possible specifications of the
framers' abstract intent."). Justice Scalia would thus accept the narrowest-tradition
default rule, see Michael H., 491 U.S. at 128 n.6, while Professor Fallon would embrace the opportunity for normative judgment, see Fallon, supra note 108, at 1255.
But see J.M. Balkin, Tradition, Betrayal, and the Politics of Deconstruction, 11
CARDOZO L. REV. 1613, 1624 (1990) (suggesting that the appropriate level of generality can be chosen through a process resembling common law development); Young,
Rediscovering Conservatism, supra note 8, at 700 (arguing that judges should use
"the level of generality used in related prior precedent").
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those ideas as a source of authority if and only if there is affirmative evidence that those ideas were part of the Framers' presuppositions. Hence, in Alden, the crucial step is the majority's
demonstration that the Framers viewed sovereign immunity as
part of the legal background against which the Constitution was
adopted; similarly, in Term Limits, the argument that the Framers viewed representative government through the lens of dual
sovereignty is equally critical.
This "linkage" step of the argument-by which the interpreter
taps into a broader intellectual tradition presupposed by the
constitutional structure-thus determines not only whether an
appeal to "big ideas" will be available at all but also the form
and "generality" of the ideas to which the interpreter can appeal.
This choice is not explicitly normative; rather, it turns on what
the relevant historical evidence shows. If Term Limits had been
decided prior to ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment, for
example, it might have been impossible to characterize the
Constitution's representative structure as presupposing an unalloyed commitment to dual sovereignty; rather, the structure
would have looked much more like a compromise between a dual
sovereignty regime (direct election of the House of Representatives), and a compact theory regime (election of the Senate by
the state legislature, which would serve as an intermediary
between the people and their senators).38 In such a case, recourse to "big ideas" might simply be impossible. Similarly, in
Alden, the versions of the sovereign immunity tradition that the
Justices could invoke were those for which they could find support in the historical record of the founding generation-not
those that the Justices chose based on a default rule or explicitly
normative criteria.3 9
238. See generally Sullivan, supra note 6, at 88-91 (describing the competing political theories in Term Limits).
239. See, e.g., Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2270-85 (surveying the historical foundations of
sovereign immunity doctrine in America). It may be, of course, that normative judgments are inevitable in the selection and handling of historical materials. See Fallon,
supra note 108, at 1212 ("Far from being a simple fact awaiting discovery by the
industrious researcher, the framers' intent must be viewed as an intellectual construct, developed through a process of interpretation, that seeks to embody the principles that furnish the best political justification for a constitutional provision and
that find substantial support in the political climate surrounding the provision's
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The second general point is that the constitutional "theory"
employed in cases like Alden, Term Limits, Printz, and Lopez is
internal to the available evidence about the original understanding of the Constitution; it is not an additional, external source of
interpretive pressure. Richard Fallon's important work on the
relationships among the various types of constitutional argument posits a different role for constitutional theory: such theories "claim to understand the Constitution as a whole, or a particular provision of it, by providing an account of the values,
purposes, or political theory in light of which the Constitution or
certain elements of its language and structure are most intelligible."24 Because more than one constitutional theory may plausibly fill this role, Professor Fallon argues that an interpreter
should choose the one that is the most "normatively attractive.""' While one might run a nonoriginalist version of "big
ideas" structuralism this way,'2 Justice Kennedy's approach is
quite different. The important point is not whether a particular
theory provides an account of the constitutional structure-and
certainly not whether that account is the most normatively attractive-but rather which theory the constitutional structure
was originally thought to have presupposed.
Third, although it is easy to see the difference between Justice
Kennedy's emphasis on high political theory in Term Limits and
Professor Black's more familiar emphasis on the pragmatic implications of constitutional structure, there will be times when
this distinction is not nearly so clear. Chief Justice Marshall's
opinion in McCulloch provides a useful example. Marshall's

framing and adoption."). But the originalist form of "big ideas" structuralism resists
the pressure toward normative judgment more than Professor Fallon would. Rather
than choose the level of abstraction at which the Framers' understandings are measured by explicitly normative criteria, see id. at 1213, the "big ideas" approach would
impose a second layer of "fit"-that is, the interpreter must select the level of abstraction that is best reflected in the historical materials themselves. If that choice
itself involves a submerged normative choice, it is at least a more constrained one
than Professor Fallon would seem to advocate.
240. Fallon, supra note 108, at 1200.
241. Id. at 1202 ("[W]here more than one theory plausibly accounts for the text
having been written as it was, an assessment along a normative dimension...
becomes inevitable and desirable.").
242. See infra text accompanying note 247.
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argument concerning the first question in McCulloch-whether
Congress has an implied power under the Constitution to create
a national bank-relies heavily on a structural argument concerning the nature and limits of written constitutionalism:2"
A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its great powers will admit, and of all the
means by which they may be carried into execution, would
partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be
embraced by the human mind. It would, probably, never be
understood by the public. Its nature, therefore, requires, that
only its great outlines should be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose
those objects, be deduced from the nature of the objects,
themselves....
This provision is made in a constitution, intended to endure
for ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs. To have prescribed the means by
which the government should, in all future time, execute its
powers ... would have been an unwise attempt to provide, by
immutable rules, for exigencies which, if foreseen at all, must
have been seen dimly, and which can be best provided for as
they occur. 2"
This is, to be sure, very practical stuff. But it is also a fairly sophisticated response to eighteenth-century conservative and reactionary criticisms of written constitutionalism, which held that
no written document could possibly respond to the complexity of
human society or to the unforeseeable future.24 5 Chief Justice
Marshall's argument is that our own constitution presupposes a

243. As I noted above, see supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text, Chief Justice
Marshall's resolution of McCulloch's second issue-whether Maryland could tax the
Bank-is a straightforward example of pragmatic Blackian structuralism. See BLACK,
supra note 152, at 15.
244. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407, 415 (1819). Professors

Gerald Gunther and Kathleen Sullivan have suggested that in light of this structural argument, Chief Justice Marshall's exegesis of the Necessary and Proper
Clause in McCulloch was virtually an afterthought. See GERALD GUNTHER &
KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 109 (13th ed. 1997).
245. See infra note 278 and accompanying text.
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political theory of written constitutionalism that is aware of and
responsive to those criticisms-that is, that does not try to meet
every conceivable (or inconceivable) need by express enumeration. Does that make McCulloch an example of "big ideas"
structuralism? Or of Blackian structural pragmatism? The best
answer is probably "both."
Finally, as the preceding discussion makes clear, Justice
Kennedy's approach to "big ideas" structuralism in Alden has a
decidedly originalist bent. It is "big ideas" that capture the original understanding of structure that count-not contemporary
political theory. This is not a necessary combination, however. One
can imagine structural arguments predicated on "big ideas" that
were not originalist in nature-that argued, for example, that
particular aspects of the constitutional structure are presently
understood or even should be understood to reflect broader commitments to a particular contemporary political theory. Such a
position would be analogous to Frank Michelman's argument that
the Fourteenth Amendment should be readin light ofJohn Rawls's
contemporary account ofjust institutions and entitlements.'
Here, again, the implications of the broader theory would be
more robust than any specific evidence available about the
meaning of "equal protection" or the structural understandings
of the Amendment's ratifiers. For that reason, such an approach would capture many of the advantages of Justice
Kennedy's approach to constitutional structure in Alden. Familiar arguments would remain, of course, over whether the constitution should be interpreted so as to maximize continuity with
historical traditions or conformity to contemporary notions of
political morality. It is not my goal to resolve those arguments,
but rather to suggest that Justice Kennedy's "big ideas"
structuralism has broad implications that reach beyond the confines of originalist argument.
IV. EVALUATING ALDEN'S STRUCTURAL JURISPRUDENCE

I hope to have demonstrated in the preceding Part that a
particular kind of structural argument-that is, structural argu246. See Frank I. Michehnan, The Supreme Court, 1968-Foreword: On Protecting
the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 14-16 (1969).
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ment based heavily on the abstract political theory of the Framers-has played a central role in the "federalist revival." In particular, this approach is integral to the jurisprudence of Justice
Kennedy, who typically casts the Court's critical "swing vote" in
federalism cases.247 This Part addresses two questions about this
form of structural argument. First, does it make a helpful contribution to constitutional interpretation? And second, is it consistent with the "judicial conservatism" generally espoused by the
Court's pro-states majority?
In concluding that "big ideas" structuralism has potential, I
do not wish to argue for this approach as an exclusive theory of
interpretation or to paper over its potential liabilities. Nor do I
wish to take a strong position here on the degree to which this
sort of structural argument should be privileged vis-h-vis other
forms of constitutional analysis. 248 My purpose here is simply to
suggest that the distinctiveness of "big ideas" structuralism
from other, more well-recognized modalities like textualism and
originalism is not itself a reason to reject this approach as illegitimate or unhelpful.
A. The Advantages of StructuralArgument from "Big Ideas"
I am inclined to think well of Justice Kennedy's general approach to structural argument. As I have suggested in the preceding Part, the "big ideas" approach tends to address the primary
deficiencies of the textualist use of structure and Charles Black's
more open-ended approach. The textualist's use of structure to
illuminate only the meaning of particular textual provisions runs
into the problem, as Philip Bobbitt has observed, "that sheer text
does not address many situations which the constitutional sense
ofjudges tells them must be addressed."249 On the other hand, the

247. Compare, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (Justice Kennedy
supplying the fifth vote to strike down a federal law), with U.S. Term Limits v.
Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (Justice Kennedy casting the fifth vote to strike down
a state term limits law); see also supra notes 196-205 and accompanying text.
248. Cf BOBBrrr, supra note 90, at 3-119 (describing six different modalities of constitutional argument, each of which may have varying force in different contexts);
Fallon, supra note 108, at 1223-24 (arguing that the various modalities must be
ranked in a hierarchical order so as to avoid a "commensurability problem").
249. BOBBrIT, supra note 90, at 76; see supra notes 92-122 and accompanying text.
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relentlessly pragmatic emphasis of Blackian structuralism may
prove excessively manipulable in the hands of a skilled practitioner.2 5 These are both forms of the indeterminacy objection:
Structured textualism leaves one with no guidance at all in areas
where the text runs out, while Blackian structuralism offers a
tool of such universal flexibility that it consistently proves too
much.
"Big ideas" structuralism offers at least a partial cure for both
forms of this ailment. By grounding the institutions created by
constitutional text in the political theory of the Framers, this
approach offers a recourse to a set of ideas that is more robust
than both the text itself and the set of circumstances that may
have been specifically foreseen by its drafters. In Term Limits, for
example, the Qualifications Clauses hardly resolve the question
whether states may limit federal terms, and there is little evidence that the Framers ever focused on that question. Yet the
political theory of dual sovereignty is more robust than the text
or the original debates in the sense that its implications sweep
more broadly than the particular questions the Framers addressed. For this reason, it is possible to derive from that theory a
particular answer to the question in the case.25 ' In deriving that
answer, moreover, it is important that this political theory tradition is external not only to the text but also to the particular facts
and exigencies of the case before the court. This fact helps to
maintain the confidence that "law" is being applied, rather than
simply the preferences of the judge in the form of what makes
"practical sense" in the particular situation.
Justice Kennedy's approach yields two other important benefits. First, it downplays technical, lawyer-like arguments about
the ins and outs of particular provisions in favor of broad generalities about the principles and purposes of the Constitution. To
the extent that the Constitution must serve as a conventionalist
"focal point" for citizens, 252 the structural approach may help
further that goal. This will not always be true: When opinions
degenerate into a word by word parsing of particular theoretical

250. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.

251. See supra notes 200-05 and accompanying text.
252. Strauss, supra note 90, at 910.
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texts-such as the exchange between Justices Scalia and Souter
in Printz-they are unlikely to yield principles of broad accessibility.2 5 3 And sometimes the "big ideas" that the Court taps into
are themselves archaic, intricate, or both, like the sovereign
immunity doctrines debated in Alden. But cases like Term Limits-in which Justice Kennedy's concurrence alone rises above
the hand-to-hand historical combat to make a general argument
of broad accessibility--demonstrates the method's potential. 2
Efforts to ground constitutional holdings in broad constitutional
principles thus seem, in the run of cases, likely to increase the
accessibility of constitutional reasoning rather than to decrease it.
Second, "big ideas" structuralism may serve as a particularly
useful vehicle for "translation" of the original structure established by the text into modern context.2 15 As I have suggested, the
institutional environment created by the Constitution has
changed fundamentally over the course of our history, often with256
out any corresponding change in the constitutional text.
"Translation" seeks to maintain fidelity to the presuppositions of
the original constitutional structure in the changed institutional
context. 25 "Big ideas" structuralism is useful for these purposes
because the "big ideas" at the heart of the approach are typically
integral to the presuppositions that the interpreter is seeking to
maintain. In other words, when Justice Kennedy asks in Lopez
how we maintain a system of dual sovereignty in the context of a
modern integrated economy,2 58 he is asking precisely the right
question for purposes of translation.

253. See supra note 230.
254. Contemporaneous news accounts of Term Limits understandably emphasized
Justice Kennedy's position and the proportionally small portions of the majority opinion that reflected that position. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, High Court Blocks Term
Limits for Congress in a 5-4 Decision, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1995, at Al.
255. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEM L. REV. 1165 (1993)
[hereinafter Lessig, Fidelity in Translation]; Lawrence Lessig, TranslatingFederalism:
United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 125 [hereinafter Lessig, Translating
Federalism].
256. See supra notes 168-70 and accompanying text.
257. See Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, supra note 255, at 1184-85.
258. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 575-80 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concur-

ring).
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Finally, recourse to broad arguments of political theory may,
in some cases, facilitate efforts to reach consensus on multimember courts. This is frequently not the case; as Cass Sunstein has
observed, judges "may be unwilling to commit themselves to
large-scale theories of any kind, and they will likely disagree with
one another if they seek to agree on such theories."259 But the
federalism cases may offer a counterexample. In Term Limits, for
example, Justice Kennedy abandoned his usual place in the
Court's pro-states majority based entirely on a commitment to
the political theory of dual sovereignty.2 And opinions by other
Justices in other cases indicate that-the Term Limits dissent
notwithstanding-the idea of dual sovereignty has more than five

votes behind it.261 I have thus argued elsewhere that agreement
on dual sovereignty at the level of theory may provide a basis for

forging a broader consensus on federalism issues at the Court,262
although cases like Alden and Seminole Tribe stand as disappointing reminders that such agreement may not always be
enough.26 3 In any event, the role played by theory in at least some
of these cases suggests that "big ideas" may sometimes make con2
sensus-building less difficult rather than more so.

259. Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733,
1735 (1995); see also id. at 1746-47 (suggesting that judges . . . should not challenge . . . one another's deepest and most defining commitments").

260. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), may be another example. In
that case, Justice Souter-since a staunch member of the Court's nationalist minority

-was persuaded to join an opinion relying heavily on "big ideas" structural arguments in condemning the commandeering of state legislative bodies. Similar arguments failed to convince Justice Souter in Printz, however. See Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898, 919-23 (1997).
261. See, e.g., College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219, 2238 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting for four Justices); Seminole
Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 150-55 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting for three Justices); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457-59 (1991) (O'Connor, J., writing for majority of five).
262. See Young, State Sovereign Immunity, supra note 48, at 70-72.
263. See infra note 328 and accompanying text (noting Justice Kennedy's failure in
Alden to accept the implications of dual sovereignty for state sovereign immunity in
federal question cases); see also Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 150-55 (Souter, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's similar departure from dual sovereignty).
264. Professor Sunstein appears to acknowledge this possibility, although he does

not seem to think it will be realized in many situations. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 50-51 (1996) ("Sometimes seemingly similar
cases provoke different reactions, and it is necessary to raise the level of theoretical
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The method is not without potential pitfalls, however. As the
phrase implies, "big ideas" involve a form of what Professor
Sunstein has called "conceptual ascent," by which a relatively
particularized issue or principle is "made part of a more general
theory." 6 5 Such general theories may be too abstract to be useful;
Laurence Tribe has argued, for example, that the Constitution's
system of separated and divided powers should be understood not
in terms of "what the Framers thought, nor in what Enlightenment political philosophers wrote, but in what the Constitution
itself says and does."266 Historical commitments to abstract theories may turn out to be more rhetorical than real; some commentators have argued, for example, that the Framers' rhetorical
commitment to a theory of separation of powers did not translate
into any coherent approach to concrete institutional design that
could be applied to resolve actual cases.Y Such examples suggest
that the structuralist interpreter must "pick his spots" with care.
Some general theories reflected in the historical materials may
turn out to be useful tools of interpretation, while others may
only contribute to confusion in constitutional doctrine.
The conceptual ascent associated with "big ideas" may also
drive a tendency to treat the Constitution as reflecting a coherent "grand design." I have argued elsewhere that our Constitution-which embodies any number of compromises and
contains provisions arising out of markedly different periods in
our history-probably does not reflect any such coherence, and
that efforts to achieve coherence through interpretation may
hinder the Constitution's ability to protect divergent values. 68

ambition to explain whether those different reactions are justified or to show that
the seemingly similar cases are different after all .

. .

. By looking at broader prin-

ciples, we may be able to mediate the disagreement.").
265. Id. at 51.
266. TRIBE, supra note 194, § 2-3, at 127.
267. See, e.g., William B. Gwyn, The Indeterminacy of the Separation of Powers in
the Age of the Framers, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 263 (1989).
268. See Vermeule & Young, supra note 103, at 749; see also TRIBE & DORF, supra
note 232, at 24 (describing "the fallacy of hyper-integration" of "treating the Constitution as a kind of seamless web"); Sunstein, supra note 259, at 1748 (arguing that
.any simple general theory of a large area of the law . . . is likely to be too crude
to fit with the best understandings of the multiple values that are at stake in that
area").

20001

THE JURISPRUDENCE OF STRUCTURE

1657

This objection, like the abstraction problem, counsels caution
rather than rejection of the structural method. Some "big
ideas," like the common law conception of sovereign immunity,
remain fairly localized in that they do not purport to unify
broad sections of the Constitution. Even more ambitious theories like dual sovereignty are not imperialistic in the sense that
they would dictate a particular approach to, say, due process or
equal protection. The important point is that the structuralist
interpreter should employ "big ideas" where they can shed light
on particular aspects of the constitutional structure without
imposing a single, grand unified theory on the Constitution as
a whole.
Finally, an interpretive method that seeks to resolve particular cases through commitments on more general questions of
theory poses certain risks for the Court's decision processes. I have
suggested previously that such an approach may sometimes actually facilitate agreement on divisive issues, contrary to Professor
Sunstein's theory of "incompletely theorized agreements."269 But
there will also undoubtedly be situations where, consistent with
Sunstein's theory, disagreement on theory may impede agreement on particular results. 7 Moreover, a broad commitment to a
particular theory may impede the Court's ability to make incremental adjustments to the relevant constitutional doctrines over
time.2 ' Some of the arguably more successful aspects of our state
sovereign immunity doctrine-such as the development of exceptions for suits against officers and municipalities, as well as recognition of waivers of immunity-are most readily characterized

269. See supra text accompanying notes 259-64.
270. Cf. TRIBE, supra note 194, § 1-14, at 69 n.70 (arguing that in Term Limits, a
"potentially narrow question" about the Qualifications Clauses "needlessly escalated
into the breathtakingly broad questions of just what the Federal Union really is, to
whom it answers, and how it relates to the fifty states that some say comprise it").
Although my own view is that the turn to theory actually facilitated agreement in
Term Limits itself, see supra text accompanying notes 259-60, it is easy to see how
raising the stakes in this way might undermine prospects for consensus. See
Sunstein, supra note 259, at 1748.

271. See Sunstein, supra note 259, at 1749 (arguing that a "completely theorized
judgment .. . would be unable to accommodate changes in facts or values"); Young,
Rediscovering Conservatism, supra note 8, at 653-56, 711-12 (arguing for an
incrementalist approach to legal doctrine).
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as incremental adaptations in response to other doctrinal developments. 2 2 And while some of these aspects, such as the officer
suit doctrine, can be anchored in common law immunity theory,27
it seems unlikely that a rigid adherence to the common law model
would have produced the nuanced set of governmental remedies
and immunities that we have.
At this stage, it seems unwise to pursue firm conclusions as to
whether the potential liabilities of "big ideas" structuralism outweigh its advantages. The questions raised here require difficult
predictions about how this interpretive method will play out if
used more often than it has been in the past: Will the turn to
theory, in the run of constitutional cases, more often facilitate or
undermine agreement among multimember panels? Can we identify "big ideas" that help explicate particular aspects of the Constitution without pushing judges toward grand unified "coherence" theories? To what extent are the other political theories
underlying various aspects of the constitutional structure sufficiently concrete, and sufficiently shared among the founding
generation, to increase the determinacy of structural interpretation? The minimalist conclusion that I want to advance here is
simply that "big ideas" structuralism has shown some promise in
the federalism cases, and that under the right circumstances this
method may prove a useful addition to the Court's interpretive
arsenal.
To say that "big ideas" structuralism may be useful, however, is not to say that it is easy. Even the best interpretive approach can be done well or poorly, and one important test of an
interpretive methodology is whether it yields ready criteria for
determining when the interpreter has used it correctly. Before
addressing that issue in Part V, however, I want to pause a
moment to ask a narrower question of ideological consistency.
B. Is It Conservative?
Justice Kennedy's structural approach represents a distinct
alternative to the textualism and originalism commonly associat272. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
273. See, e.g., Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 308 (1997) (Souter, J.,

dissenting).
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ed with his conservative colleagues on the Court, especially Justices Scalia and Thomas. This section addresses whether this
methodological divergence represents a departure from judicial
conservatism or, instead, judicial conservatism of a different
kind. In a sense, this question raises only an issue of taxonomy,
and it is not obvious why we should care whether the label "conservative" is applied to any particular approach. Nevertheless,
the inquiry is useful for two reasons.
First, an analysis of what makes Justice Kennedy's approach
"conservative" tends to highlight some of the strengths and weaknesses of structural analysis and tie them into broader debates
about interpretive methodology. 74 Second, and more important,
identification of Justice Kennedy's approach as "conservative"
highlights the fact that the Rehnquist Court's "conservative" bloc
is not monolithic, and that the Justices within it may disagree in
important ways about the proper approach to interpretation. 5
By contrast, the fundamental agreementinAlden between Justices
Kennedy and Souter on basic methodology 276 may prompt us to
question the conventional view of the Court as divided into "conservative" and "liberal" factions. We might also wonder, more
broadly, whether there is any necessary relationship between
interpretive methodology and the political tendency of substantive results.277

274. See Young, Rediscovering Conservatism, supra note 8, at 623 (arguing that
"confusion about ideological labels has seriously distorted the debate about constitutional interpretation generally").
275. See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreword:
The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 69-95 (1992) (analyzing
basic methodological differences among the Court's "conservative" justices); Young,
Rediscovering Conservatism, supra note 8,at 715-24 (same); Michael Stokes Paulsen,
The Many Faces of 'Judicial Restraint," 1993 PUB. INTEREST L. REV. 3 (same).
276. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2291 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that "[tihe Framers' intentions and expectations count so far as they
point to the meaning of the Constitution's text or the fair implications of its structure") (emphasis added).
277. This basic agreement on methodology characterizes a number of controversial
cases that we frequently think of as reflecting a "conservative"-"liberalr divide. In
addition to the federalism cases, see, for example, Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors
of University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 840, 868-72 (1995) (both majority and dissent
taking originalist view of the Establishment Clause).
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The case for "big ideas" structuralism as a legitimately "conservative" methodology begins with the classical conservative

critique of textualism. That critique-developed most forcefully
in late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth-century European circles as a reaction against the French Revolutionaries--did not
attack textualism as an interpretive methodology so much as the
very idea of a "textual" or written constitution."' These conservatives preferred the unwritten British "Constitution"-an organic
accumulation of customs and institutional practices not delimited
by any central written text. 279 The present-day inheritors of this
tradition tend to advocate interpretive methodologies that emphasize the organic aspects of our own constitutional regime-most
importantly, the incremental development of constitutional doctrine through judicial precedent.2 8 °
Two aspects of this conservative critique of textuality are
important in assessing the structuralism of the current Court.
First, the classical conservatives held that any attempt to capture
the needs of a political community in a written document would
be necessarily incomplete, given the inherently limited capacity
of human reason to anticipate and respond adequately to those
needs. Second, the conservatives feared the potential of constitutional text to replace the organic and incremental development
of society with a radical break from the past. After all, these

278. See, e.g., JOSEPH DE MAISTRE, Essay on the Generative Principle of Political
Constitutions, in THE WORKS OF JOSEPH DE MAISTRE 147, 161-62 (Jack Lively trans.,
Schocken Books 1971) (decrying the idea that a political "constitution [could] be written or made a priori," and asserting that a "constitution is divine," thus, "It]he corpus of fundamental laws that must constitute a civil ... society [can] never ... be
written").
279. See, e.g., 2 EDMUND BURKE, Thoughts on the Present Discontents, in THE
WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF EDMUND BURKE: PARTY, PARLIAMENT, AND THE AMERI-

CAN CRISIS 1776-1774, at 241, 277 (Paul Langford & William B. Todd eds.,
Clarendon Press 1981) (defending the British Constitution by contrasting "scheme[s]
upon paper" with "a living, acting, effective constitution"); Young, Rediscovering Conservatism, supra note 8, at 665-69 (discussing the Burkean critique of written
constitutionalism); see also J.G.A. POCOCK, Burke and the Ancient Constitution: A
Problem in the History of Ideas, in POLITICS, LANGUAGE AND TIME: ESSAYS ON POLITICAL THOUGHT AND HISTORY 202, 202-32 (1971).
280. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Bork v. Burke, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 509,
515-23 (1996); Young, Rediscovering Conservatism, supra note 8, at 691; see also
Strauss, supra note 90, at 884-90 (describing "common law constitutional interpretation").
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thinkers had the French Revolution freshly (and painfully) in
mind.28 '
"Big ideas" structuralism responds to each of these criticisms.
It begins by recognizing the necessary incompleteness of the written document. It is precisely because the Framers could not have
considered every question in advance that the structuralist seeks
to identify the broader presuppositions that the Framers held.
These presuppositions, which had frequently developed over
many generations and through applicationto innumerable diverse
circumstances, are generally more robust than the limited set of
possibilities addressed in the text itself. Recourse to such "big
ideas" therefore helps us to overcome the human limitations of
the founding generation's work.
Structuralism also tends to minimize, or at least mitigate, the
written document's break with the past. An opinion like Alden
recognizes that the Constitution rests on a foundation of ideas
and practices which frequently are only reflected -not comprehensively captured-by the document itself. By using the preexisting background to flesh out the structural implications of the
Constitution, structuralism serves the basically conservative
purpose of preserving that background intact. Structuralism is in
this sense similar to the statutory canon holding that statutes in
282
derogation of the common law should be narrowly construed.
281. Conservatives like Edmund Burke tended to view the American Revolution as
a much less radical departure, see, e.g., 5 EDMUND BURKE, An Appeal from the New
to the Old Whigs in Consequence of Some Late Discussions in ParliamentRelative to
the Reflections on the French Revolution, in THE WORKS OF THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
EDMUND BURKE 1, 36-37 (Henry Frowde ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1925) (1791) (arguing that the American Revolution was essentially "defensive" in nature); see also
George F. Will, Why Celebrate this Revolution?, WASH. POST, July 13, 1989, at A23
(observing that "[tihe American Revolution was a conservative act, arising organically
from a tradition it aimed to recapture"), although I am not aware of any comment
by Burke on America's venture in written constitutionalism. By 1789, Burke was
preoccupied by events in France.
282. Indeed, the common law is a frequent source of the structural principles articulated in cases like Alden. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 13031 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that state sovereign immunity derives
from the common law); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890) (same). Alden thus
bears a kinship to numerous cases that essentially import common law understandings to define the content of otherwise open-ended constitutional terms. See, e.g.,
Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 610-19 (1990) (Scalia, J.) (defining "due
process" to include at a minimum those practices sanctioned by settled usage at
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This canon, as David Shapiro has pointed out, tends to promote
continuity in the law over time.2 83
To be sure, "big ideas" structuralism carries some serious
risks for conservatives. The Framers were, in some ways, "great
gamblers on the power of untested abstractions,"2 ' and many of
those abstractions are precisely the sort of "big ideas" that
Alden's structuralism may accord decisive weight. Although I
have already noted the abstraction problem as a drawback of this
method, this vice ought to particularly vex conservatives. In describing the Burkean form of conservatism, for example, Alexander Bickel observed that "[t]rue believers[,] ... theorists, and
ideologues made the French Revolution, and for Burke a politics
of theory and ideology, of abstract, absolute ideas was an abomination, whether the idea was the right of the British Parliament
to tax the American colonies or the rights of man."2 85 This conservative distrust of abstract theory, however, is better taken as a
caution than a prohibition. Much of Burke's own work, after all,
consists of articulating the somewhat inevitable abstract principles immanent in established political institutions.2 8 6
A related problem arises from the potentially disruptive impact of abstract "big ideas" on settled practices and institutions.
For example, Frank Michelman argued in the late 1960s that the
Equal Protection Clause should be construed to reflect John
Rawls's theory of distributive justice.2 87 These arguments are
essentially structural in character: What is doing the work of

common law). Here, too, the common law practice offers a more robust set of rules
than could be gleaned from parsing the text alone.
283. See David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 949-50 (1992).
284. Bruce Ackerman, The Common Law Constitution of John Marshall Harlan, 36
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 5, 9 (1991).
285. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, Edmund Burke and Political Reason, in THE MORALITY
OF CONSENT 11, 19 (1975); see generally Young, Rediscovering Conservatism, supra
note 8, at 644-47 (discussing Burke's aversion to abstract theory).
286. See, e.g., 5 BURKE, supra note 281, at 129 (insisting that "[tihe theory contained in [the Reflections on the Revolution in France] is not to furnish principles for
making a new constitution, but for illustrating the principles of a constitution already made"); see also Robert M. Hutchins, The Theory of the State: Edmund Burke,
5 REV. POL. 139, 139 (1943) (observing that Burke "could seldom leave a question
without a fling at the theory of it").
287. See Michelman, supra note 246, at 14-16.
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interpretation is a particular political theory that the constitutional document is thought to embody. And obviously such an
interpretation, if adopted, would produce a fairly radical discontinuity with past practices.
Although "big ideas" structuralism might support such interpretations in principle, this seems unlikely as a practical matter. As I have noted, the structural approach of Justice Kennedy's
opinion in Alden, as well as of other Justices in cases like Printz
or New York, is firmly originalist: Any broad structural principle-like dual sovereignty or sovereign immunity-must be
shown to be rooted in the historical understanding of the Framers.
That should rule out anachronistic attempts like Michelman's to
read contemporary philosophical notions into the constitutional
structure. Moreover, an important partofthe Court's structuralist
method has been to check the implications drawn from "big ideas"
theory against actual historical practice. 8' It is therefore not surprising to find that the primary function of structuralist interpretation in the federalism cases has been to rule out innovative
practices-term limits, executive and legislative commandeering,
attempts to abrogate state court immunities-that have rarely
been attempted in our history.
The basic agreement on method between Justices Kennedy
and Souter in Alden raises two final issues. The first, which I can
only flag here, is whether there is any necessary relationship between interpretive philosophy (i.e., textualist, structuralist) and
substantive ideology (i.e., nationalist, states' rights). The federalism cases suggest that if such a relationship exists, it is not a
strong one. In Alden itself, Justices Kennedy and Souter each
accept the same basic premises of structuralist argument, but
end up at diametrically opposed positions on the merits. The
same could be said of the opposing opinions in Printz and Term
Limits."9 Other commentators have argued that other interpretive methods show a similar diversity of outcomes. Professor
Eskridge has suggested, for instance, that a textualist approach to

288. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2261-62 (1999).
289. Not all the federalism cases can be characterized in this way. In Lopez, for
instance, it seems fair to say that the dissenters did not consider the structural idea
of enumerated powers to be a principle that courts may legitimately enforce. See
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 608-11 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting).
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statutory construction does not reliably produce politically conservative results.2 90
If interpretive methodology is not strongly related to outcomes, then the second issue is: What does that mean? Does
structuralism's failure to produce politically reliable outcomes
show that the method is too constraining simply to implement
the interpreter's preferences? Or does it show that in any given
case, structuralism is so manipulable that the individual judge
can follow his heart? One way to evaluate these conflicting
conclusions would be to ask, in Alden, whether we can judge
one of the two conflicting structuralist opinions to be "better"
based on some criteria other than the political palatability of
the result. I examine this question in the next Part.
V.

STRucTuRAL ARGUMENT AND JUDICIAL CONSTRAINT

Structural argument, like any other form of constitutional
interpretation, can be done well or poorly. For this reason it is
important to identify criteria for separating good structural arguments from bad ones; indeed, it may be fair to say that the
existence and workability of such criteria are themselves the
sine qua non of a viable interpretive approach. One important

class of criteria-there are surely others-relates to the ability
of a given method to constrain the interpreter, so that he is in
some meaningful sense implementing the meaning of the Conjudges,
stitution rather than his own preferences.2 9 1 Responsible
292
like traditional poets, prefer to play tennis with a net.

290. See Eskridge, supra note 86, at 668-69 (observing that in recent statutory construction cases, the "new textualism" of Justice Scalia had not frequently correlated
to politically conservative outcomes).
291. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 2, 4 (1971) (arguing that constitutional principles must be neutral both in application and derivation in order to overcome the judges' lack of any
majoritarian mandate for their decisions); Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules
Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV.
781, 784-85 (1983) ("Interpretivism . . . [is] designed to remedy a central problem of
liberal theory by constraining the judiciary sufficiently to prevent judicial tyranny.").
292. In a 1966 interview, Robert Frost commented that "I'd as soon write free
verse as play tennis with the net down." THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS
295 (Angela Partington ed., 4th ed. 1996).
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The important question thus becomes whether big structural
ideas can constrain an interpreter, or whether they inevitably
become tools for justifying a result reached in fact on other
grounds. Although no source of constitutional meaning constrains
absolutely, it is hard to see why structural principles would
always constrain less than, say, an exclusive focus on text.293
Robust historical concepts like sovereign immunity or dual sovereignty, for example, are surely more determinate than some of
the Constitution's grand generalities like "due process" or "cruel
and unusual."
A key test of a given application of "big ideas," then, is whether
the principle is robust enough to contain well-established inherent limitations, and, if so, whether the interpreter has respected
those limitations. It is here that Justice Kennedy's opinion in
Alden falls down. Although respectable historical antecedents
were available to ground the majority's "fundamental postulates'--such as the English common law or classical political
theory conceptions of sovereignty and sovereign immunity-the
majority expressly disavowed those antecedents as well. The
result is a sovereign immunity jurisprudence that is wholly untethered and, as a result, subject to no constraint other than the
preferences of five Justices.
A. The Alden Court's Treatment of Sovereignty Theory
As I have suggested, "big ideas" structuralism seeks to mitigate the problems associated with conventional textualism and
originalist approaches by recurring to a set of broader understandings which can be shown to have formed the theoretical
backdrop against which the Constitution was adopted. We might
ask, for example, "What did the founding generation understand
by the term 'sovereign immunity?'" or "Where did the concept
come from historically?" Although there is precious little evidence
on the precise question of whether Congress was understood to
have the power to subject the States to suits in their own courts,

293. See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1,
2 (1984) (suggesting that "the text, if read with an appropriately generous notion of

context, provides as lively a Constitution as the most activist judge might need").
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as the Alden majority admitted,2 94 there do turn out to be fairly
determinate answers to the more general questions. Sovereign
immunity was a well-developed concept by the eighteenth century, with a history of its own and a set of well-established limiting
principles.2 95
When general "postulates" of state sovereign immunity are
used to invalidate an act of Congress, as they were in Alden, we
are entitled to ask where those postulates come from. Justice
Kennedy's opinion vacillates between two answers to this question. The first is the idea, originally articulated in Justice Scalia's
Union Gas dissent,29 that state sovereign immunity is a survival
from the English common law-a principle that formed part of
the preconstitutional legal background and that was not abrogated
by the Constitution's adoption in 1789.297 This view is consistent
with the precise question addressed in the ratification debates,
that is, whether Article III, of its own force, would strip the states
of their preexisting immunity.2 98 Chisholm later held that Article
III did abrogate this immunity, and Justice Iredell's dissent in
that case-which Hans and its progeny have interpreted as hav-

294. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2260-61 (1999).
295. See id. at 2247-52; see also 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 206; Borchard, supra
note 206; Jaffe, supra note 206.
296. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 29 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
297. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2260-61.
298. See id. at 2248-49, 2260-61; Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 69-71
(1996). Even the idea that state sovereign immunity predated the Constitution is not
strictly correct, however. As Justice Souter pointed out, "[tihe American Colonies did
not enjoy sovereign immunity, that being a privilege understood in English law to be
reserved for the Crown alone." Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2271 (Souter, J., dissenting). The
best answer to this argument, as Justice Souter also recognized, is that the states
became sovereign once they had wrested their independence from the Crown, and
that they brought this sovereignty with them into the Union except to the extent
they surrendered it to the national government. See id. at 2282 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("Every State in the Union in every instance where its sovereignty has not
been delegated to the United States, I consider to be as completely sovereign, as the
United States are in respect to the powers surrendered." (quoting Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 435 (1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting))). The short-lived nature
of preconstitutional state sovereignty in America suggests caution in importing English -sovereignty concepts to the American Constitution, as the ways in which those
concepts would have to be adapted to the new American context had not had much
time to settle out by 1789.

20001

THE JURISPRUDENCE OF STRUCTURE

1667

ing been adopted somehow through ratification of the Eleventh
Amendment 2 9 9 -focused on rejecting this claim. 00
Justice Kennedy's opinion in Alden contained language emphasizing the common law view. He used evidence about English
common law sovereign immunity to refute Justice Souter's argument that such immunity applies only where the sovereign is the
source of the law at issue.'' Justice Kennedy characterized the
history as demonstrating that "no one, not even the Constitution's most ardent opponents, suggested the document might
strip the States of the immunity."3 02 But in so doing, he conflated
the question whether "the Constitution stripped the States of
immunity in their own courts" and the quite different issue
whether the
Constitution "allowed Congress to subject them to
30 3
suit there."
One might answer "no" to the first question based only on a
view that the Constitution did not disturb well-established background legal principles unless it clearly said so-a view much like
applying the canon disfavoring statutes in derogation of the common law to constitutional interpretation.3 0 4 But to answer the
second question, one has to evaluate where these preconstitutional common law norms ranked in the post-constitutional legal
hierarchy. In other words, were they themselves of constitutional
stature? Or could they be modified by duly enacted federal legislation?

299. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890); see also Alden, 119 S. Ct. at
2253-54.
300. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 429-50 (Iredell, J., dissenting subsequently)

(arguing that because Article III did not itself strip the States of their preexisting
immunity, that immunity should not be held to have been overridden absent a clear
statutory directive from Congress). Justice Iredell's dissent did, however, include
isolated statements suggesting that such an attempt to override the states' immunity
might be unconstitutional. See id. at 436-37 (Iredell, J., dissenting). These statements, however, are isolated and tentative, and should not be confused with the

main thrust of his dissent.
301. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2257. I discuss Justice Souters argument infra notes
305-09 and accompanying text.
302. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2260.
303. Id. at 2261.
304. See, e.g., Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603, 623
(1812) ("The common law . . . ought not to be deemed to be repealed, unleds the
language of a statute be clear and explicit for this purpose."); see also Shapiro, supra note 283, at 936-37 (discussing this canon and its relationship to federalism).
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These questions, as Justice Souter demonstrated in Seminole
Tribe, turn out to have a fairly clear answer. The founding generation spent a great deal of time thinking and debating about the
status of common law norms inherited from the mother country.0 5 Where they decided to adopt those norms-mostly as a
matter of state law-they did so through specific reception statutes, and it was clear in every case that those norms remained
subject to modification by subsequent acts of the state legislatures. 3 6 The Framers debated whether to include a similar reception provision in the federal Constitution, but rejected the idea
precisely because incorporation of the common law into the Constitution would render it immune from legislative alteration.3°
Instead, the few aspects of the common law that the Framers
wished to constitutionalize-like the right to jury trial-were
included as specific constitutional amendments.3 8 It follows that
other preexisting principles like sovereign immunity must remain
subject to alteration by statute, just like any other common law
rule. °9 We must therefore look elsewhere for authority to support
the Court's constitutionalprinciple of state sovereign immunity.

305. See Ford W. Hall, The Common Law: An Account of Its Reception in the
United States, 4 VAND. L. REV. 791 (1951); Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common
Law: Part One, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 1003 (1985); Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal
Common Law: Part Two, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1231 (1985); William B. Stoebuck, Reception of English Common Law in the American Colonies, 10 WM. & MARY L. REV.
393 (1968).
306. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 159-64 (1996) (Souter, J.,
dissenting); WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830, at 90 (1975);
WOOD, supra note 223, at 299-300; Hall, supra note 305, at 796. The state law on
common law reception uniformly made clear, in addition, that only so much of the
common law was adopted as was adapted to the circumstances of the new nation.
See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 136-37 (Souter, J., dissenting); ROSCOE POUND, THE
FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW 20 (1938); Hall, supra note 305, at 805. From

this principle, it is easy to argue that sovereign immunity-as a vestige of arbitrary
government antithetical to democratic principles-should not be viewed as having
survived the Revolution. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 95 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
One need not accept this broader argument in order to agree that sovereign immunity,
like any other common law concept, is subject to alteration by subsequent legislative
act.
307. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 104-05 (Souter, J., dissenting).
308. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2270 n.1 (Souter, J., dissenting).
309. It is this aspect of the majority's reasoning that undergirds Justice Souter's
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Aware, after Seminole Tribe, that the English common law
was a dead end, Justice Kennedy argued that "[a]lthough the
sovereign immunity of the States derives at least in part from the
common-law tradition, the structure and history of the Constitution make clear that the immunity exists today by constitutional
design."31 That design is vague at best, absent any reference to
particular constitutional provisions composing it. Justice Souter
comes up with about as charitable an interpretation as possible
when he reads the majority's "references to a 'fundamental
aspect' of state sovereignty as referring not to a prerogative inherited from the Crown, but to a conception necessarily implied
by statehood itself. The conception is thus not one of common law
so much as of natural law, a universally applicable proposition
discoverable by reason.""'
Justice Souter's reference to "natural law" may have been
unfortunate in that, while perhaps technically correct, it seems to
have distracted the majority from the dissent's real point. 2 "Natural law" in common legal parlance has come to signify another
form of "brooding omnipresence in the sky"313 that is employed to
invalidate legislation that runs against the judge's own prefercomparison, both in Alden and in Seminole Tribe, of the current Court's state immunity
doctrine to the Lochner Court's conception of substantive due process. See id. at
2294 (Souter, J., dissenting); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 166-67 (Souter, J., dissenting).
As Cass Sunstein has demonstrated, Lochner's dominant characteristic was its exaltation
of common law baselines-such as freedom of contract-to the level of constitutional
norms immune from legislative alteration. See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87
COLUM. L. REv. 873, 882 (1987).
310. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2256.
311. Id. at 2270 (S6uter, J., dissenting). Several references in the majority opinion

support Justice Souter's identification of the majority position with "natural law."
See, e.g., id. at 2262 (quoting Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527, 529 (1857),

to the effect that "[t is an established principle of jurisprudence in all civilized
nations that the sovereign cannot be sued in its own courts, or in any other, without its consent and permission"); see also Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 69 (arguing
that the doctrine of Hans "found its roots not solely in the common law of England,

but in the much more fundamental jurisprudence in all civilized nations' (quoting
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 17 (1890))).
312. See Alden, 199 S. Ct. at 2270 (Souter, J., dissenting).
313. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).

Justice Holmes used the phrase to describe not natural law, but the pre-Erie "general"
common law. The common law, Holmes argued, should be understood not as "not a
brooding omnipresence in the sky but the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasisovereign that can be identified." Id. (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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ences.3 14 Justice Kennedy thus answered the natural law point by
insisting that "[we seek to discover... only what the Framers
and those who ratified the Constitution sought to accomplish
when they created a federal system. We appeal to no higher authority than the Charter which they wrote and adopted."'1 5 But
this response fundamentally misunderstood the dissent's argument. Justice Souter's point, I believe, was not that the majority
was appealing to a source of law "higher" than the Constitution
itself, but rather that the majority's understanding of the constitutional structure itself incorporated an abstract conception of
sovereign immunity drawn from works of classical political the3 16

ory.

Having reconstructed the majority's argument in this way,
the dissent bent over backwards to address it on its own terms.
The majority's first error, Justice Souter argued, lay in incorporating the wrong historical version of sovereign immunity theory.
Because a "natural law" view of immunity was not widely held by
the founding generation, Justice Souter contended that the majority should be restricted to the common law version of sovereign
immunity. 317 Such a restriction would, of course, require that the
immunity be abrogable by statute.
The second error was wholly independent of the first. Even if
the Framers had adhered to natural law notions of sovereign
immunity, Justice Souter asserted, the Alden majority had failed
to acknowledge the inherent limits of sovereign immunity within
that tradition-that is, the majority had ignored the historical

314. See, e.g., David Dietz, A Growing Debate on "NaturalLaw," S.F. CHRON., Sept.
13, 1991, at Al, available in 1991 WL 4205178 (describing criticisms of Justice
Thomas, prior to his confirmation, for having voiced a belief in this sort of "natural
law"); see also Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (Chase, J.) (reasoning
from natural law in this sense).
315. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2268.
316. See id. at 2272 (Souter, J., dissenting) (explaining that Blackstone first drew
the distinction between common law and natural law versions of sovereign immunity). The majority may have been helped toward its misunderstanding of Justice
Souter's point by a passage in Justice Souter's Seminole Tribe dissent likening the
Court's nontextual immunity doctrine to Justice Chase's natural law argument in
Calder. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 167 (Souter, J., dissenting).
317. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2271 (Souter, J., dissenting) (demonstrating that the
founding generation generally adopted the common law version of sovereign immunity over the natural law version).
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limitation that "natural law" sovereign immunity could be asserted only in cases where the sovereign was the source of the
law sued upon. 318 In other words, there is no warrant in a system
of dual sovereignty for state sovereign immunity vis-a-vis a claim
based on federal law.
The mention of dual sovereignty suggests a possible response
to Justice Souter's invocation of classical political theory: Maybe
there is something unique in the American theory of sovereignty
that supports the majority's view of state sovereign immunity.
But this avenue is also foreclosed. As Justice Kennedy is fond of
saying, "[tlhe Framers split the atom of sovereignty" and established "two orders of government, each with its own direct relationship, its own privity, its own set of mutual rights and obli319
gations to the people who sustain it and are governed by it."

The founding generation reconciled this idea with the older concept of unitary sovereignty by holding that unitary sovereignty
was reserved to the people themselves, who in turn parcelled out
sovereignty over different areas to the national and state govern2 The federal government, in other words, is
ments, respectively.Y
"sovereign" only within its delegated sphere of activity, and conversely the states are "sovereign" only within the scope of their
reserved powers. 32 ' The practical effect of American sovereignty
theory thus mirrors that of the classical "natural law" doctrine:
The states cannot possibly be "sovereign" as to a claim brought
pursuant to a valid federal law."2
It should be obvious by now that I find the majority's reasoning in Alden profoundly wrong on the merits. This, however,
318. See id. at 2271-73 (Souter, J., dissenting) (showing that the classical writers
on sovereign immunity limited the immunity to cases where the sovereign was the

source of the law).
319. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
320. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 151-52 (Souter, J., dissenting).
321. In a world where state and federal power is largely concurrent, a better way

of saying this may be that the federal government is sovereign where it has validly
acted pursuant to its delegated powers, and the states are sovereign where their
authority has not been validly preempted by federal law. See Stephen A. Gardbaum,
The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 812-15 (1994) (arguing that, in

a world of concurrent powers, the boundary between state and federal authority is
largely defined by preemption).
322. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 149-50 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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is an Essay about interpretive methodology rather than Eleventh Amendment doctrine. What I hope to show in the next
section is that the majority's doctrinal errors flow directly from
its failure to appreciate the limitations and potential pitfalls
inherent in Justice Kennedy's approach to structural argument.
By identifying these errors, I seek to shed some light on how to
practice "big ideas" structuralism well, and how to tell when it
is being practiced poorly.
B.

Taking Ideas Seriously (or Not)

Justice Kennedy's opinion in Alden began by taking both
ideas and their history very seriously indeed-by suggesting, in
fact, that historical concepts like sovereign immunity can be a judicially enforceable part of the constitutional design even where
23
they are not actually embodied in a piece of constitutional text.3
Although I have suggested that textualists like Justice Scalia
ought to be uncomfortable with the turn from text to structure
and abstract theory," 4 I do not mean to attack the latter approaches in the abstract.3 25 Nor is it inconsistent for the author of
Romer v. Evans326 and the coauthor of Planned Parenthood v.
Casey32 7 to view nontextual norms as judicially enforceable. Indeed, the clash in Alden between Justice Kennedy and Justice
Souter (another co-author of Casey) is an exchange between two
Justices in basic agreement about the rich diversity of possible
sources for constitutional argument.

323. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2254.
324. See supra notes 87-122 and accompanying text.
325. Justice Kennedy's approach is hardly a recent concoction of a conservative
Court. For example, Laurence Tribe has noted:
Congressional action which treats the states in a manner inconsistent
with their constitutionally recognized independent status . .. should be
void, not because it violates any specific constitutional provision or transgresses the explicit boundaries of any specific grant of authority, but
because it would be contrary to the structural assumptions and the tacit
postulates of the Constitution as a whole.
TRIBE, supra note 34, § 5-20, at 379.
326. 517 U.S. 620, 635-36 (1996) (striking down a state constitutional provision excluding homosexuals from protection of state antidiscrimination laws).
327. 505 U.S. 833, 869 (1992) (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, & Souter, JJ.)
(recognizing a fimdamental substantive due process right to abortion).
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Despite this basic agreement, I believe that the debate between Justices Kennedy and Souter can help us identify some
basic prerequisites for successful use of the structural method.
The key difference in Alden emerges in terms of the willingness
of each Justice to respect the limitations inherent in the source
material with which they are working. As I explained in the previous section, two theories of sovereign immunity were at least
arguably available in the historical materials: a common law
theory, and a natural law theory. Each of these theories had
internal limitations of its own. The common law theory, read in
light of the history of common law reception in the new nation,
could not be constitutional in stature; rather, it would have to
remain subject to congressional abrogation. On the other hand,
the natural law theory, based on its articulation in eighteenthcentury works of political theory known to the Framers, could
only apply where a state government was itself the source of the
law sued upon; in other words, it could not apply in cases raising
a federal question.
Each theory thus entailed a major principle-immunity from
suit-and an inherent limit on that principle. Fidelity to the
source material necessarily means that a court using these theories as a tool of interpretation must take the limit along with the
principle; failure to do so would be directly analogous to a
textualist reading a particular word out of historical or grammatical context. Where two distinct theories are available in the
historical materials, it is equally inappropriate to mix and match.
One cannot deploy theory B in order to meet an argument based
on the inherent limitations of theory A, then switch gears and
employ theory A to refute a claim based on the inherent limits of
theory B.
That, unfortunately, is exactly what the Alden majority did.
For Justice Kennedy, the source of the constitutional state sovereign immunity doctrine of Alden and Seminole Tribe is never
entirely clear. 2 Moreover, because Justice Kennedy never com328. See, e.g., Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2256 (suggesting that the distinction between a

common law and natural law conception of sovereign immunity is "a false dichotomy" "[als should be obvious to all"). A particularly vivid example is the following- "Although the American people had rejected other aspects of English political
theory, the doctrine that a sovereign could not be sued without its consent was
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mits to a common or natural law source for the doctrine, he is
able to employ it as a free-floating principle that can be adapted
to suit the needs of the case. When Justice Souter argued that the
Framers would never have held the English common law immunity doctrine to be of constitutional stature, Justice Kennedy
disclaimed reliance on the common law and cited language pointing toward a natural law theory. When Justice Souter responded
by invoking the principle that natural law immunity does not
apply when the State is not the source of the law sued upon, however, Justice Kennedy swapped theories again and cited common
law sources refusing to recognize that limitation. One can have it
both ways in this fashion only at the cost of stripping the method
of its power to constrain.
Justice Souter's handling of the two historical theories provides an instructive contrast. By sticking closer to the original
materials articulating the respective theories of sovereign immunity,3 29 and by paying attention to distinct bodies of historical
evidence concerning the status these ideas had for the founding
generation,3 ° Justice Souter was able to transform the amorphous concepts raised by the majority into doctrines with determinate limits. We know what those limits are because common
law immunity, natural law immunity, the mechanics of common
law reception, and the American innovation of dual sovereignty
were all working doctrines at the end of the eighteenth century.
These ideas had agreed-upon areas of application, and equally
well-recognized limitations. And by doing the hard work of recovering the contemporaneous understanding of these ideas, a judge
can employ that understanding to determine where and how
those ideas should affect contemporary law. By contrast, the
Alden majority's conception of state sovereign immunity ulti-

universal in the States when the Constitution was drafted and ratified." Id. at 2248.
Did Justice Kennedy mean the theory embodied in English common law or the "natural law" theory identified by Blackstone, but not particularly prevalent in England?
It makes a difference in analysis, if not in outcome, but the Court did not say.
329. See, e.g., id. at 2286 (Souter, J., dissenting) (identifying Hobbes, Bodin, and
other theorists as the antecedents for the natural law theory).
330. See id. at 2270 (Souter, J., dissenting) (discussing the historical evidence on
the status of English common law norms as received in the early Republic); see also
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 132-42, 160-62 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(surveying this evidence more thoroughly).
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mately has an ahistorical, "made up" feel-like a tool newly fashioned to reach a desired result.
In the end, the line of federalism cases considered here may
provide too small a sample to yield any firm conclusions about
the ability of "big ideas" structuralism to constrain judges engaged in constitutional interpretation. Justice Kennedy's performance in Alden yields some support for the view that "[tihe past
... is in its essence indeterminate," and judges will inevitably
"creatively construct" the historical materials instead of finding
determinate answers to present questions. 3 ' On the other hand,
the need to respect the inherent limitations of the source material
exists with respect to any method of interpretation,3 32 and Justice
Souter's analysis in the Alden dissent holds out some hope that
this constraint can be observed as well with the structuralist
method as any other. If I am right that important constitutional
values are captured only imperfectly in particular snippets of
text,3" then the search for viable forms of structural doctrine is
surely worth pursuing.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's holding and opinions in Alden v. Maine
will no doubt generate extensive debate. Given the significance of
the issues involved, that debate will undoubtedly focus, as it
should, on the implications of state sovereign immunity for Congressional power and the supremacy of federal law. Alden has
significant implications for constitutional interpretation as well,
however. Indeed, it seems fair to say that Alden, Printz, and
Term Limits together represent the Court's most sustained effort
to develop an interpretive approach based on implications from
structure rather than particular constitutional texts.

331. Tushnet, supra note 291, at 800.
332. See generally H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659
(1987) (discussing similar pitfalls arising under more conventional forms of
originalism).
333. See supra text accompanying notes 166-70; see also supra text accompanying
notes 128-32, 142-43, 148-50 (concluding that some textual provisions, such as the
Guarantee Clause, "proper" in the Necessary and Proper Clause, and the use of
"state" throughout the Constitution, are essentially textual mandates for structural
argument).
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From this perspective, Alden stands both as a hopeful indication of new interpretive possibilities and a sobering reminder
of how structural interpretation can go astray. By tapping into
the robust "big ideas" that undergird the constitutional structure, Alden offers a welcome relief from the endless rehashing
of snippets of Constitutional Convention rhetoric or the indeterminate parsing of eighteenth-century dictionaries. But Alden
likewise warns that structural inferences can become a vehicle
for imposing judicial preferences once "big ideas" are severed
from their historical nuances and qualifications. These difficulties, in the end, are not significantly different from those
attending any of the other modalities of constitutional interpretation, and it should not be surprising to find that here, too,
there are no easy cures. For the present it is enough to say
that structural interpretation appears to be here to stay, and
that the Court's work in this area will benefit from careful and
systematic attention to the particular benefits and pitfalls of
this approach.

